



Daily Report

Sub-Saharan Africa

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17 November 1992

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Angola

UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi is reportedly in Zaire, seeking military aid, Maputo Radio reported. Meanwhile, Luanda Radio says that diplomats see the recall of the Zairian ambassador is an indication of a "deterioration of bilateral relations" between the two countries. The Angolan Government has accused Zaire of aiding UNITA leader Savimbi by stationing troops along a two kilometer stretch of their common border.

Burkina Faso

Foreign Minister Thomas Sanon denied a charge made by the ECOMOG second in command that Burkinabese soldiers are fighting alongside Charles Taylor's NPFL forces, Paris International reported. Mr. Sanon stated that Burkina Faso was in the process of seeking approval from the National Assembly to provide a contingent of Burinkabese soldiers to the ECOMOG forces in Liberia.

Liberia

According to Monrovia Radio, Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, fled to Burkina Faso aboard a "large Cessna plane." Taylor is reportedly accompanied by an "entourage of relatives."

Somalia

An armed gang attacked a group of American relief workers in the capital, Mogadishu, Voice of the Somali Republic reported. The gang tried to "hijack" three trucks carrying food supplies.

Cameroon**Gendarmes in Bamenda; Journalists Warned**

*AB1611203692 London BBC World Service in English
1830 GMT 16 Nov 92*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Hundreds of Cameroonian gendarmes have been drafted into the northwestern town of Bamenda to enforce the state of emergency imposed after the disputed presidential elections. The opposition Social Democratic Front, led by John Fru Ndi, launched a ghost town campaign, forcing shops to shut for five days a week to protest against the reelection of President Biya, who won by a narrow majority. The protest is now in its second week and the gendarmes are being accused of victimizing opposition supporters. From Bamenda, journalist Christopher Anou telexed this report:

For the first week, the campaign went well until last Friday [13 November] and Saturday when gendarmes stormed shops in the market, forcing the owners to close. The gendarmes argued that unless business operates throughout the week, they are not going to allow it to sell on the two days of grace. Anyone who goes contrary to their instructions is arrested and thrashed. This was true for Nigerians who were whisked away to a nearby hall belonging to the CPDM [Cameroon People Democratic Movement] Party, flogged, and then asked to swim in a pool of water the gendarmes were using as a toilet. Their crime was opening their shops for business. I personally witnessed gendarmes supervising the closure of the Bamenda town main market on Saturday morning.

At 4am on Friday [13 November] a yet to be identified group broke into the national secretariat of the SDF [Social Democratic Front] and took away all communication equipment they found. Five guards including Dr. Zama Ndefru of the Cameroon Anglophile Movement, CAM, were kidnapped. The act had been attributed to security men who have had a checkpoint opposite the secretariat. On the same morning, only an old lady rescued the book shop of John Fru Ndi from being burned by gendarmes.

The tense atmosphere has made it impossible for newspapers to circulate in the province for fear of confiscation. On Saturday, gendarmes broke into a newspaper kiosk on the Bamenda Commercial Avenue, confiscating copies of the town based OUR PEOPLE newspaper which had reported that 3,000 people had been arrested in the province. Radio and television journalists in the province have been warned not to make any further reports about the situation there.

Congo**President Lissouba Meets Party Leaders**

*AB1611143092 Brazzaville Radio Nationale Congolaise
Network in French 1830 GMT 14 Nov 92*

[Excerpts] The president of the Republic, Professor Pascal Lissouba, granted a series of 14 audiences today. His visitors included Monsignor Desmond Tutu of South Africa, a delegation of the Evangelical Church of Congo, and the Speaker of the National Assembly. [passage omitted]

The last two audiences were granted to a delegation of the Union for Democratic Renewal, led by Mr. Bernard Kolelas and representatives of the parliamentary majority. All the audiences, except those accorded Monsignor Tutu and the Evangelical Church, focused on the political situation prevailing in our country. Mr. Kolelas told newsmen about their audience with the head of state:

[Begin Kolelas recording] We were summoned to a meeting by the head of state to discuss the current situation in the country. We listened to what the head of state had to say, and he also listened to what we had to say. The members of my delegation and myself decided to go and think over how to get the country out of the present crisis and we promised to give him an answer tomorrow. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Andre Mouelle, the speaker of the National Assembly, also discussed the prevailing political situation in the country. He said that the issue of the parliamentary majority is an exclusive topic to be tackled only by the head of state. He gave more details to our reporter Gilbert David Mutaka:

[Begin recording] [Mouelle] You know that we are experiencing a critical situation in the country and that the head of state thought that an exchange of views was in order. Taking into account the relations existing between the National Assembly and the executive organ, the head of state believed it fair to discuss the situation with us. We reviewed the crisis situation prevailing in our country.

[Mutaka] Mr. Speaker, you discussed the possible dissolution of the National Assembly. What about it?

[Mouelle] I do not see why you are already talking about a dissolution. I am the speaker of the National Assembly; I have my own views on the overall situation prevailing in the country and I have to submit them to the head of state. He is the one entitled to make a decision on a possible dissolution of the assembly. He is the only one empowered to dissolve the National Assembly. [passage omitted] [end recording] [passage omitted]

Zaire

National Conference Adopts Draft Constitution

*AB1711093292 Libreville Africa No. 1 in French 0730
GMT 15 Nov 92*

[Text] In Kinshasa, the National Conference has just adopted Zaire's new draft constitution. In fact, according to the document, Zaire will henceforth be called the Federal Republic of Congo [RFC]. The RFC will have a parliamentary regime with two chambers—

the Senate and the National Assembly. In other words, the prime minister will wield most of the power. The president of the Republic, who will be elected by universal suffrage, will embody the unity of the nation and no more.

This draft constitution was adopted without the presidential group which has for a long time chosen to practice the empty chair policy. A constitutional referendum will be organized in the coming weeks, according to the National Conference.

Kenya**KANU Official's Convoy Stoned***AB1611164492 Paris AFP in English 0853 GMT 15 Nov 92*

[Excerpt] Nairobi, Nov 15 (AFP)—[passage omitted] Kenyan Education Minister Joseph Kamotho, who is also KANU secretary general, escaped unhurt on Friday night after his convoy was stoned by opposition supporters in Murang'a District of central Kenya.

According to press reports here on Sunday, security aides and police reinforcements had to fire 28 rounds into the air before they could rescue Kamotho from the enraged mob, who attacked him as he tried to campaign in his Kangema constituency. Several people are also reported to have been injured in the fracas.

Murang'a District is a stronghold of the opposition Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) Asili, led by one-time Cabinet minister and political detainee Kenneth Matiba. Since unofficial campaigns started for the forthcoming first multi-party elections in 26 years, seven people have died from politically related violence.

The election date had been set for December 7 was now certain to be delayed after the Kenyan High Court upheld a petition on Thursday [12 November] by the main opposition FORD-Kenya party complaining of inadequate time allowed for nomination of candidates for presidential, parliamentary and civic elections.

Electoral Commission Shifts Polls to 29 Dec*EA1611200692 Nairobi KTN Television in English 1800 GMT 16 Nov 92*

[Text] The Electoral Commission has set the new election day for 29 December. According to an amended gazette notice issued this evening and signed by the commission's chairman, Justice Chesoni, party nominations are expected to have been completed by 7 December. Parliamentary and civic candidates nominated will then hand in their papers to their respective returning officers on 9 December. Presidential aspirants will also hand in their papers on 14 December when electioneering starts for polling on 29 December.

The electoral process, which had been set in motion early this month, was interrupted when FORD [Forum for the Restoration of Democracy]-Kenya instituted a civil suit to stop it and the suit was granted by the high court. The bone of contention was that the attorney general has irregularly amended nomination provisions by shortening the nomination period from 21 days to eight.

Somalia**UN Secretary General's Letter Aired***EA1611191092 Mogadishu Voice of the Somali Republic in Somali 0445 GMT 15 Nov 92*

[Text] Dr. Butrus Butrus-Ghali, the UN secretary general has sent a message (concerning?) the problems of Somali people to Somali people wherever they may be. He said that, as he had stated on 2 November, the UN objective in working in Somalia is to stabilize [word indistinct] the problem that is facing their country, and for this to be done it is necessary to have good working fraternal relations between the Somali people and the international community. He continued that he would like to stick to the UN goal so that it is not abandoned. This goal is based on peace and cooperation and can be translated into reality after securing a foundation of understanding and team work between the United Nations and Somali people.

The secretary general said that in employing the United Nations we shall stress the observation of the agreements we have reached with Somali leaders [word indistinct] on the participation of the UN troops. He said that as he had mentioned, the aim is to pave the way to saving lives and to dismantle the problems created by drought and fighting, and also to pave the way for political reconciliation.

Armed Gang Attacks American Relief Workers*EA1611192892 Mogadishu Voice of the Somali Republic in Somali 0445 GMT 15 Nov 92*

[Text] An armed gang has attacked a group of 18 Americans relief workers and their Somali guards. As reported, the workers at that time were not working and were passing by the Mogadishu airport. The armed gang attempted to hijack three vehicles [words indistinct] of relief and tried to shoot at the guards of the workers who immediately asked for help over the radio, which was answered by the Pakistani UN peacekeeping force with their armored personnel carriers.

Goldstone Commission Statment on MI Operation

*MB1611155992 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1419 GMT 16 Nov 92*

[SAPA PR Wire Service issued by the Honourable Mr. Justice Richard Goldstone, Monday, 16 November 1992: "Press Statement by the Honourable Mr. Justice R.J. Goldstone; chairman of the commission of inquiry regarding the prevention of public violence and intimidation"]

[Text] 1. Since February 1990, the state president has set the government's face against the involvement of the security forces of the state being involved in criminal, illegal and dishonest practices and particularly in relation to political violence and intimidation. Indeed last Thursday evening the state president stated at the annual foreign correspondents' dinner that it was unacceptable to the government for the state security forces to be involved in party political covert operations.

2. When the commission was appointed, I was informed then and assured in unequivocal terms by the state president and by the minister of justice that the commission would operate at all times as an independent judicial commission. That assurance has been scrupulously honoured by the state president and the government. So, too, have the other political role players in South Africa respected the independence of the commission.

3. The commission was given unusual and, for South Africa, unique powers. In particular, I would refer to the power of search and seizure.

4. The commission has previously reported that the main cause for present violence arises from the political rivalry between the African National Congress [ANC] and the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP]. It has also reported that it had been presented with no evidence of an organized "third force" and that there was no evidence implicating senior members of the security forces in political violence and intimidation. The commission stated that it would investigate fully any such evidence.

5. On Wednesday of last week, 11 November 1992, an investigation launched by the commission led it to a building which housed a large operations unit of Military Intelligence. The commission came to that unit as a direct consequence of a witness brought to the commission by members of the South African Police. On the basis of the information given to the commission's counsel and efficient detective work performed by Colonel H. Heslinga, police official on the staff of the commission, together with members of one of the commission's investigation teams, the Military Intelligence Operational Centre was discovered. Two of the international experts attached to the commission's investigation units participated in the investigation.

6. With the assistance of reinforcements provided by the South African Police, the building housing the Military Intelligence unit was sealed and five files were seized. The files were sought in consequence of the information provided to the commission by the aforementioned witness.

7. The files seized by the commission disclose the following information:

(A) From May 1991 until 31 December 1991 Military Intelligence employed Mr. Ferdi Barnard, a notorious former member of the CCB [Civil Cooperation Bureau].

(B) Mr Barnard's employment resulted from a referral to the "director of Covert Collection", (DCC) by the chief of staff intelligence, Lt General R Badenhorst.

(C) From May 1991 Barnard was employed for a trial period at a monthly salary of R[and]3,000.00 and operational expenses of R800.00 per month. From 1 August 1991, he was employed on a permanent basis at a salary of R3,500.00 and operational expenses of R2,000.00 per month. That employment was recommended by DCC and approved by Lt General Badenhorst.

(D) As became public during 1990, Barnard is a former SAP [South African Police] Drug Squad sergeant and has two previous convictions for murder, one for attempted murder and three for theft. In 1984 he was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. The effective sentence was 6 years. In 1988 he was released on parole and soon thereafter employed by the CCB.

(E) In consequence of his previous convictions, Barnard was not allowed to possess a firearm. On 6 June 1991, for the reason that he required it for his personal safety, DCC recommended to Lt General Badenhorst that Barnard should be issued with a pistol. He said that:

"6. The options open in request of issuing a firearm are as follows:

A. Issue of a SADF [South African Defense Force] weapon;

B. Issue of a front company weapon.

7. It is recommended that a firearm be issued to this chief agent as his situation in respect of the past and present is totally understood."

Lt General Badenhorst refused to approve the issue of a firearm to Barnard.

(F) On 20 June 1991, Barnard submitted to Military Intelligence a suggested plan for the task force he was to lead. The following points emerge from his report:

(I) It was to specialize solely on the activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe ("MK") [Spear of the Nation—ANC military wing]:

(II) In particular it was to concentrate on the involvement of MK in crime and its relationship with criminal syndicates. For that purpose MK members were to be used to infiltrate the criminal elements and where such members could not be recruited they would be criminally compromised. For that purpose use would be made, inter alia of prostitutes, homosexuals, shebeen [speakeasy] owners and drug dealers;

(III) As an example of the manner in which members of MK would be compromised criminally or amongst their own members reference is made by Barnard to the case of Mr. Peter Mokaba. (During May 1991 Mr Mokaba was widely reputed in the press as having been a police spy. That was denied by him and soon thereafter he was elected as president of the ANC Youth League).

(IV) Barnard's team had the ability to obtain access to:

- The computer system of the SAP Criminal Bureau;
- Contacts at immigration control;
- Contacts at licensing authorities;
- Revenue office computers;
- The voters roll;
- Credit bureaus; and
- An independent group of telephone "bugging experts".

(V) Barnard's plan detailing inter alia the abovementioned information was submitted to senior members of Military Intelligence and thereafter he was employed as a chief agent.

(G) One of the persons used by Barnard or one of his sub-agents was involved in the installation of computers at the ANC headquarters.

(H) Barnard's plan and followed-up reports were submitted to senior members of Military Intelligence. In a report dated 23 August 1991 reference is made to a "support agent network" of "prostitutes, homosexuals, night club managers and criminal elements."

(I) On 19 December 1991 an article appeared in "BEELD" in which it was reported that a Mr. Christopher Human had appeared in court on a charge of being in unlawful possession of an Uzi machine gun. In a bail application Mr. Human is reported to have alleged that the weapon has been left with him by Barnard who tried to recruit him and an escort agency woman as spies for Military Intelligence.

(J) According to the BEELD article a spokesman for the Army denied that Barnard was employed by the Army. That denial was false.

(K) On 19 December 1991 the BEELD article was drawn to the attention of DCC and "he instructed that (Barnard) be placed 'on ice' immediately."

On 30 December 1991 DCC instructed that Barnard's services be terminated with immediate effect "upon instructions from the minister".

(L) Barnard's services were terminated with effect from 31 December 1991. He was paid three months salary in advance (R10,500) i.e. in respect of January, February and March 1992.

(M) A report by the "handler" of Barnard reported as follows on 9 January 1992:

"This source was 'sacked' on 31 Dec 91 on instructions of the minister of defence. Contact is still being made in order to achieve the following:

A. Finalize all financial matters resource is handling including receipts for an o/s advance of R5,483.95 for medical expenses.

B. To stabilise source in order to dissuade from acting irrationally and embarrassing SADF."

(N) In a further report dated 21 January 1992, the same "handler" stated that Barnard's "attitude towards SADF [was] still sour but his relationship with (the handler) is strong enough for (Barnard) to stay on track and not to go to a newspaper and cause trouble. (Handler) attempting to provide (Barnard) with genuine investigation private work."

(O) References are contained in the files stating that the ANC is involved in criminal conduct including counterfeiting money and illegal transportation of weapons.

8. In short, the Barnard files indicate that—

(A) Highly placed members of Military Intelligence were party to the employment of a person with a serious criminal record involving crimes of violence and dishonesty.

(B) The SADF made a public statement denying that Barnard was employed by it when it was known in high quarters that such denial was quite untrue.

(C) At least one senior officer of Military Intelligence was prepared to recommend the illegal arming of Barnard with an SADF weapon. He was able, without any apparent adverse consequence, to himself to make such recommendation to Lt General Badenhorst.

9. In the Operational Centre in question there are 48 members who operate credit cards. The expenditure by way of the cards involve hundreds of thousands of rands. One of the 48 members, until his recent dismissal, was Mr. L.W.J. Flores, who was detained by the British police on suspicion that he was involved in a plot to murder former policeman Mr. Dirk Coetzee.

10. The commission believes that no decent member of the security forces would support or approve of such conduct or behaviour by any branch of those forces. It can only be calculated to undermine their respect for the

legitimacy and moral base of their own organisation and jeopardize the efficiency and resolve to fight against crime.

11. In recent weeks the head of the Army, Lt General Meiring, has made public statements implicating MK in criminal conduct inter alia regarding the planned use of "special operations teams" from the PWV [Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereenigen] area to sabotage government installations in certain homelands and townships. These and other statements have now been publicly supported by the minister of defence and General Kat Liebenberg, the head of the Defence Force. The public of South Africa are entitled to be informed by an independent source whether this type of allegation is true.

12. There are widespread perceptions supported by evidence that in Natal and elsewhere the IFP and ANC have ready access to automatic weapons.

13. The South African Police have been singularly unsuccessful in apprehending the culprits responsible for thousands of political murders over the past couple of years.

14. The IFP at marches in Johannesburg and Durban have openly flouted the law regarding the display of dangerous weapons at political meetings. No criminal prosecutions have been instituted against any of the organisers.

15. For months the Azanian People's Liberation Army has claimed responsibility for the murder of many white and black members of the South African Police.

16. The morale of the South African Police is being jeopardized on a daily basis by verbal and physical attacks on its members. Its capability to fight the frightening level of violence is being seriously eroded.

17. The commission has no doubt that political violence and intimidation in South Africa will not be effectively curbed until there has been a thorough investigating of all South African public and private security forces and armies whether situated inside or outside the borders of South Africa. For the commission to continue to multiply its enquiries would amount to an attempt to treat the symptoms and not the disease of violence in South Africa.

18. No successful and constructive multi-party negotiations are likely to be held in the present climate of mutual suspicion and distrust. It is highly unlikely that free and fair elections could be held in the present climate of violence and intimidation. No investment will take place in South Africa until a democratic and peaceful climate has been created.

19. In his report to the Security Council of the United Nations of 7 August 1992 the secretary-general stated inter alia:

"69. The long-standing capacity for violence by the various political groups in South Africa is so central to the lack of trust in the political life of the country that I

feel it must be remedied. Accordingly, I recommend that the Goldstone Commission undertake a series of investigations into the functioning and operations of certain agencies, inter alia, the army and police, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the kwaZulu Police and, more generally, certain private "security firms". My special representative has discussed this proposal with Justice Goldstone and certain of the parties who are of the view that such investigations could indeed serve to curb violence and be of benefit to the country as a whole. While such investigations would widen the scope of the work of the Goldstone Commission, they could be undertaken within its present terms of reference. Should the commission need further financing for its expanded work, I would urge the government to be forthcoming."

The recommendations of the secretary-general were adopted by the Security Council in Resolution 772 of 17 August 1992.

20. The South African Government and also the ANC accepted the recommendations of the secretary general.

21. The commission does not presently have the resources or the authority and co-operation of the relevant parties to carry out the investigations suggested by the secretary-general. Indeed, it does not have the resources to search the many hundreds of files it has found at the Military Intelligence establishment discovered by it on Wednesday.

22. The commission calls on all political parties and groups in South Africa and, in particular the government, to authorise and empower the commission, or any other independent body, to carry out urgently and fully the recommendations of the secretary-general. It also calls on the international community to assist in the speedy and efficient execution of that recommendation.

23. If the present climate of violence, intimidation, fear and suspicion is removed, the commission believes that it will be able to play a meaningful role in building a security force, both the police and army, which will have the support and confidence of the vast majority of South Africans. Only then will this country have a real prospect of peace and prosperity.

President De Klerk, ANC Reactions

MB171106509/ Johannesburg Radio South Africa
Network in English 0600 GMT 17 Nov 92

[Text] State President F.W. de Klerk has denied that the security forces have a mandate to undermine the ANC [African National Congress], and said any individuals found doing so will be called to account.

President de klerk was asked to comment in an interview with Britain's Channel Four television news on the finding of the Goldstone Commission that the Defense Force had used individuals with criminal records in a plot against the ANC. He conceded that there might be, as he put it, elements related to a few individuals, but

said if any evidence emerged of an act by a member of the security forces that violated the basic rule of impartiality, the government wanted to know of it, and would take appropriate action.

Mr. Justice Goldstone said in his announcement that according to the files, the chief of staff of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant General Witkop Badenhorst, was one of a number of senior officers who had known of the appointment of former CCB [Civil Cooperation Bureau] agent Ferdi Barnard in May last year. The files show that Mr. Barnard had been hired even though the officers had known that he had a serious criminal record. Mr. Barnard had been head of a task group which had attempted to compromise the ANC by linking its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation—MK], to criminal acts and crime syndicates. He was dismissed in December last year by former defense minister, Roelf Meyer.

Mr. Justice Goldstone asked for his investigative powers to be extended so that his commission could investigate the police, MK, APLA [African People's Liberation Army], the kwaZulu Police, and private armies.

In its reaction, the ANC said the revelations confirmed that the state had conducted a vicious campaign of misinformation and propaganda against the organization since its unbanning in 1990. The ANC said it was in favor of the extension of the Goldstone Commission's terms of reference, so that it could investigate the security forces.

Foreign Minister Comment

MB1711080592 Johannesburg Radio South Africa
Network in English 0515 GMT 17 Nov 92

[From the "Radio Today" program]

[Text] Acting State President Pik Botha says the government will give urgent attention to the Goldstone Commission's disclosure. He spoke to Catherine Rademeyer:

[Begin recording] [Botha] The position is exactly as was stated in Judge Goldstone's report, and there you will see very clearly that the relevant minister instructed that he should be dismissed, and from that you can conclude that the government certainly was not aware of that specific appointment, and that's it.

You know there's one matter that concerns me. There are attacks from all around us, directed at the state president, and various ministers. It is as if the country as a whole had forgotten what the position was two, three, four years ago, and how we had to undergo a tremendous change, all of us, and we're all required to adapt to change to a new era in the process of transforming our whole society, and mistakes have been made and will probably be made, but what is important is that this government President de Klerk established and created, the instruments, then took the initiative to create instruments like the Goldstone Commission. That is the

clearest indication of what they now call our desire not to cover, to allow anything that might still be wrong to be open, and to create the possibility of revealing that, and I thought I should mention that for a change.

[Rademeyer] But Mr. Botha, surely somebody has to be held accountable. Is the government going to hold the South African Defense Force accountable and take action?

[Botha] At this stage, as acting state president, I yesterday received a letter from Judge Goldstone in which he indicated that he had further evidence on this matter, and that that evidence together with further inquiries would, in due course, form the basis of a report to the state president, and I trust that you will agree that the state president must await this report from Judge Goldstone before he can really make any further comment.

[Rademeyer] Now, Judge Goldstone has requested that the government give him wider powers. Are you going to allow him this?

[Botha] It's not so much a question of wider powers. I have his report here in front of me, and it is rather a question of, I think, of the capacity, the means to do his work effectively and efficiently, and that I indicated in the statement yesterday evening the government stands ready to do.

[Rademeyer] You mentioned earlier, Mr. Botha, that these actions were taken during a different era. Isn't it time then, now that we are in a transition process, to reveal all the undercover operations which the government or any departments of the government were involved in?

[Botha] No. Maybe you misunderstood me. Not all these actions were done in a different era. It is a prolongation of a transformation process, and then there would be mistakes, but it is precisely because of that concern that President de Klerk took the initiative to create instruments like the Goldstone Commission. In other words, what I'm saying is that we do not agree with activities of this nature, otherwise why would we have created specific instruments which would make it possible for activities of this nature to be discovered? I can only say that what we have done could not have been done smoothly. No society has been capable of transforming itself in reasoned humanist history, of which I'm aware, so calmly and smoothly that nothing went wrong.

[Rademeyer] Mr. Botha, just briefly. These revelations could severely damage the peace process and the negotiation process. Do you expect any effect in this area?

[Botha] You will notice that Judge Goldstone himself gives us the reason for further inquiries into the other organizations as well, that once he could complete—that's how I understand him—inquiries and investigations, then we could expect a more transparent procedure.

[Rademeyer] But do you expect negotiations to be affected?

[Botha] No, not seriously, as long as we can reveal, as long as we have an instrument like the Goldstone Commission to carry out tasks through that kind of inquiry, we will remove suspicion and mistrust, I hope, in the meantime negotiations can continue. [end recording]

Defense Minister Reaction

MB1711080692 Johannesburg SAPA in English
2313 GMT 16 Nov 92

[SAPA PR Wire Service issued by the South African Communication Service: "Statement by the Minister of Defence and of Public Works [to] Press Statement by Mr. Justice R.J. Goldstone"]

[Text] The minister of defence and of public works responds as follows to the above statement:

The minister of defence and of public works, Mr. Gene Louw, at this stage, has nothing to add to the statement released by the acting state president, Mr R. F. Botha. Released by the minister of defence, Pretoria: 16 November 1992

National Party Reacts

MB1611174192 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1702 GMT 16 Nov 92

[Text] Pretoria Nov 16 SAPA—The National Party [NP] on Monday [16 November] reaffirmed its view that state agencies could not be used against legitimate political parties or organisations. Reacting to the Goldstone Commission's earlier disclosure that a former Civil Co-operation Bureau member had been involved in subversive activities against the ANC's [African National Congress] military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation (MK)], the NP said it "remained, however, the duty of state agencies to guard against and to investigate possible criminal and/or subversive activities".

The National Party said it supported Judge Richard Goldstone's submission that the truth about MK's alleged involvement in planning sabotage on a wide front should be established as a matter of urgency. "The whole question of MK's involvement in crime, criminal syndicates and political violence demands a thorough investigation, especially in view of the ANC's acknowledgement that they have lost control over elements in MK," the statement signed by MPs Chris Fisser and Dr Johan Steenkamp said.

Police Commissioner Comments

MB1711093292 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0804 GMT 17 Nov 92

[SAPA PR Wire Service issued by the South African Police: "Statement by the Commissioner of the South African Police, General Johan van der Merwe"]

[Text] In reply to a statement by the Honourable Mr. Justice Goldstone on 16 November 1992, I wish to comment on the following aspects concerning the South African Police [SAP]:

1. As far as the "witness", who was presented by the South African Police to the commission is concerned, I wish to point out that the purpose of presenting a "witness" was to prove that allegations made to the VRYE WEEKBLAD of 30 October 1992 by Mr. Joao Alberto Cuna, a deserter from the Mozambiquan Army, are false and to refute his claim that he was paid by the South African Police to inter alia commit certain acts of violence.

During questioning by the commission certain facts came to light which then led to the discovery of the Military Intelligence Operational Centre by the commission.

2. In regard to the claim that the computer system of the Criminal Bureau of the South African Police was accessed by Mr. Ferdi Barnard and his team, I wish to state that the South African Police was not given an opportunity to establish whether this is true or to respond thereto.

3. In regard to the chairman's comment that the South African Police "have been singularly unsuccessful in apprehending the culprits responsible for thousands of political murder over the past couple of years", I wish to point out that such a statement could fuel the preception that the police are unwilling or incapable of solving such crimes.

It also contradicts the judge's own view "that the morale of the South African Police is being jeopardized on a daily basis by verbal and physical attacks on its members".

The chairman should take note of the successes that the South African Police have achieved in solving crimes of a political nature. During the past four months 1,241 arrests were made in connection with 251 cases in which 517 people were killed in political violence.

Since the beginning of 1991, 1,704 AK-47 rifles and 2,802 revolvers and pistols were seized.

If the possible consequence of the use of these weapons are considered thousands of lives were probably saved.

Since 1 July 1991, 16,691 cases of illegal possession of firearms were investigated which resulted in 13,146 prosecutions.

The case of unlawful possession of an Uzi machinegun, referred to by the chairman, which was investigated by the South African Police, was remanded on request of the defence to 17 February 1993 for the purpose of applying for indemnity.

With reference to the IFP [Inkatha Freedom Party] marches in Johannesburg and Durban where dangerous

weapons were displayed, I wish to state that, as far as the Johannesburg march is concerned, the matter is still being investigated and the case docket will be submitted to the attorney-general in due course. With regard to the Durban march certain contraventions of the law were indeed investigated and the case docket presented to the senior public prosecutor who declined to prosecute. This matter is however being investigated further.

It is regretted that the South African Police was not given an opportunity to test the allegations which were made before the commission or given an opportunity to present evidence.

When untested allegations are presented in such a manner that it is perceived as facts, it contributes to an already false perception that the South African Police is unwilling or unable to perform its task. Issued by the SAP, Pretoria, 17 November 1992

Azapo Calls for Resignations

MB1711081092 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0546 GMT 17 Nov 92

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 17 SAPA—The government must resign immediately because of disclosures by the Goldstone Commission of inquiry of Military Intelligence efforts to discredit the African National Congress [ANC], the Azanian Peoples Organisation [Azapo] said on Tuesday.

In a statement, Azapo Publicity Secretary Strini Moodley said State President F.W. de Klerk could establish his credibility and his sincerity only through the resignation of his entire cabinet.

"Mr. De Klerk cannot hide any longer behind the tired cliché 'we did not know'," said Mr. Strini.

Azapo urged the ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress "and all other progressive organisations" to resist any temptation to deal or negotiate with the Mr. De Klerk and his government "until Mr. De Klerk and his government have demonstrated publicly their willingness to resign".

UN Observers 'Shocked'

MB1611192992 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1757 GMT 16 Nov 92

[Excerpts] Johannesburg Nov 16 SAPA—The United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) has expressed shock and dismay at revelations by the Goldstone Commission that Military Intelligence (MI) used former CCB [Civil Cooperation Bureau] member Ferdi Barnard to compromise the African National Congress [ANC]. "UNOMSA calls on the South African Government and all relevant parties to give their fullest cooperation to the Goldstone Commission in its work and urges the South Africa authorities to take immediate and effective measures to enable the Goldstone Commission to implement the measures announced by Justice

Goldstone today," Chief of Mission Angela King said in a statement in Johannesburg. [passage omitted]

UNOMSA on Monday night expressed its full support for Mr Justice Goldstone's call to be granted the authority to investigate the functioning and operations of, inter alia, the South African Army and Police, Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation (MK); ANC military wing], the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the kwaZulu Police and certain private security firms. It believed such investigations could serve to curb violence and benefit the country as a whole.

UNOMSA also offered its full cooperation to the Goldstone Commission and Mr Justice Goldstone, stating it was ready to give any assistance needed to enable the commission to carry out its work effectively.

De Klerk on Resumption of Constitutional Talks

MB1611173992 London BBC World Service in English 1515 GMT 16 Nov 92

[Interview with South African President De Klerk by BBC reporter Jerry Paxman in London on the "Focus on Africa" program; date not given; first paragraph is studio introduction—recorded]

[Text] The date for resumption of stalled political negotiations in South Africa is still up in the air. The last formal contact between the National Party Government and the African National Congress [ANC] was nearly two months ago. President de Klerk himself has been in Britain this weekend, watching the South African rugby team play England, but he's held talks with the British Prime Minister John Major. Mr. de Klerk's also been talking to the BBC about his political future, about some of his colleagues who have recently resigned, and about his own attitude towards apartheid. Jerry Paxman asked President de Klerk if he would be prepared to apologize for apartheid:

[De Klerk] It resulted in many things which were wrong and I have said it over and over publicly, inasmuch as that has happened, we are sorry that it has happened.

[Paxman] Do you believe God created all men equal?

[De Klerk] Yes.

[Paxman] And you would be happy for a granddaughter of yours to marry a black man?

[De Klerk] I am not involved in racial discrimination whatsoever. I never prescribe to my children what they should do.

[Paxman] But it would not trouble you if she made such a decision?

[De Klerk] Well, I think generally speaking everybody would like his people to carry on within the cultural embrace of your own nationalism. I am an Afrikaner,

preferably I would like to see my children marry somebody from our church and also an Afrikaner, but if any son of mine or daughter of mine would choose to do else wise, I will honor his or her choice.

[Paxman] Now, it's three years, nearly three years since you talked about a new South Africa. In that period, thousands of people have died, unemployment has got worse, white people say they can no longer walk their own streets safely, and still black people have not got the vote, what's gone wrong?

[De Klerk] Negotiation has to a certain extent been delayed, unfortunately on two occasions by the ANC, breaking away just as we were making good progress. The first time in May 1991, the second time in July this year, but negotiation is alive and well and although there is a perception at the moment of pessimism—yes, we are not making headway—there is a very dynamic situation developing of bilateral negotiations taking place almost daily. We, as government, we are negotiating in all directions.

[Paxman] Supposing you don't finish the process by the end this Parliament, what happens then?

[De Klerk] I really don't envisage that we won't finish it, we are in a hurry, I think 1993 is going to be a crucial year and I am working for a new transitional government and in terms of a transitional constitution being in place well before my mandate period of five years are over.

[Paxman] But on the question of what constitutes majority rule, you and the ANC are an irresistible force and immovable object. You must look at a possibility that you won't get an agreement by the end of this Parliament?

[De Klerk] But we have already made sufficient progress, enabling me to say with confidence there is already convergence of views with regards to important aspects. Firstly, that there will be in the first phase, a government of national unity on the basis of power-sharing governing in terms of a transitional constitution. There is already convergence of views that there will be regions and regional governments, we must now negotiate which functions will go down. There is already convergence of views on the fact that increased majorities will be needed by a new, elected constitution-writing body which will also serve as Parliament in the transitional period so I have sound reasons when I say it's not just being hopeful, yes we are going to succeed in reaching consensus.

[Paxman] Are you sure you have the whole of your party behind you?

[De Klerk] Yes, a new game has been developing, that is, to suggest that I don't have my party behind me. I am firmly in the seat and I don't feel threatened in any way whatsoever. Two ministers have resigned and...

[Paxman interrupting] And your general secretary is giving up?

[De Klerk] For health reasons and my general secretary for very personal reasons and all three of them are absolutely politically fully behind us and inasmuch as their circumstances might allow, will continue to play a constructive role in our party.

[Paxman] Don't you think on the question of the ANC and that there is splits in that organization as well, that you might be better off trying to make, with as much speed as you can, a deal with Nelson Mandela before someone more radical takes over?

[De Klerk] I am not working for a split in the ANC and I don't expect the split as such to occur. The ANC is a complicated organization, I get along well with Nelson Mandela, but also with many of the other leaders and I think we must make a deal which is representative of a consensus which they must also forge within their own ranks.

[Paxman] Do you regard Nelson Mandela in this process as a partner or as a rival?

[De Klerk] Well, I think in the party political sense we are definitely opponents because we will be vying for supporting and we will be fighting an election [words indistinct] against each other but I regard him as a very important interlocutor in the negotiating process, one of the important leaders in South Africa who has a fundamental role to play in this process.

[Paxman] Do you like him?

[De Klerk] We get along well.

De Klerk In 'Power' Until ANC Meets Conditions

MB1611112492 Johannesburg THE STAR in English
16 Nov 92 p 3

[Report by Garner Thomson: "F.W. 'To Keep Power Unless ANC Reforms'"]

[Text] London—President F.W. de Klerk has vowed to hold on to power in South Africa indefinitely unless the ANC [African National Congress] meets his bottom-line conditions for power-sharing, according to the London SUNDAY TIMES.

In an exclusive interview with the newspaper's Africa correspondent, Richard Ellis, De Klerk is said to have taken a "hardline stance" to head off Nationalist MPs who accuse him of giving too much away in talks with the ANC.

Ellis writes that the President says no deal will be made unless the ANC fully accepts his "fundamental requirements".

These, the paper reports, include the installation of a government of national unity whoever wins a multiracial election, the introduction of a bill of rights to protect minorities and individuals, and provision for strong regional government.

Ellis adds: "The ANC would also have to transform itself into a political party, declare the armed struggle over and abandon its armed wing."

He quotes De Klerk as saying: "There can be no implementation of agreements before these problems are sorted out."

The interview with Ellis was conducted in Pretoria before the President left for his visit to Britain, where his approach in a speech to the South Africa Club was rather less confrontational.

He painted a picture of a South Africa beset with problems, but ready and able to deal with them.

However, Ellis reports that, according to NP [National Party] sources, "De Klerk has indicated that, if necessary, he would use recently introduced legislation to stay in office beyond March 1995, even though under the current constitution he would have been forced to hold a whites-only general election.

"De Klerk would appoint a number of 'moderate' blacks to the Cabinet in an attempt to deflect criticism that he was merely continuing white rule."

ANC, Bophuthatswana Delegations Hold Talks

*MB1611192892 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1851 GMT 16 Nov 92*

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 16 SAPA—The possible resumption of constructive negotiations between the African National Congress [ANC] and the Bophuthatswana government received a boost on Monday [16 November] following a meeting in Johannesburg between delegations of the two parties. In a joint statement, the ANC and the Bophuthatswana government said various issues and concerns were discussed at the meeting, the first indication of a thaw in relations between the two parties.

The two delegations, led respectively by ANC Deputy Secretary General Jacob Zuma and Bophuthatswana State Affairs Minister Rowan Cronje, discussed the resumption of negotiations, the ANC's regional policy, the release of political prisoners and free political activity in the homeland. "The two parties agreed on the need for the speedy resumption of multilateral negotiations with adjustments aimed at ensuring the more efficient functioning of such a forum," the statement said.

It said the ANC regional policy document was received with special interest by the Bophuthatswana delegation and it was agreed to continue discussing the document as well as a scenario document for regional government developed by Bophuthatswana. The ANC's concern over political prisoners and the lack of a climate of free political activity in the homeland would receive attention at later meetings between the two parties.

ANC Interim Foreign Investment Guidelines

MB1611104392 Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 16 Nov 92 p 3

[Report by Simon Barber: "Guide unveiled for U.S. investors"]

[Text] New York—The ANC [African National Congress] and COSATU [Congress of South African Trade unions] have unveiled a set of "interim" foreign investment guidelines which they want U.S. campaigners to help enforce until a new government is in a position to legislate a code of its own.

The guidelines, released at a conference of ANC solidarity groups at the weekend, would go into effect once power had been transferred to a "national unity" executive.

In stressing that new investment "should enhance employment creation", they represent the ANC's first formal attempt to discriminate between types of investment.

ANC economic planning chief Trevor Manuel said he hoped the transitional authority would be in place by next April.

Manuel said he envisaged U.S. state and local government replacing their sanctions laws with language binding U.S. companies to the code.

Don Mkhwanazi, co-ordinator of the ANC's trade and investment group, said the guidelines would bridge the gap between new investment flowing into the country and the ANC having the power to legislate its own regulations.

The guidelines are broad, and not especially onerous compared with the statement of principles and the similar State Department code American companies currently have to comply with under residual clauses of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.

Investors should be willing to recognize workers' rights, provide equality of opportunity, be environmentally sensitive and offer "conditions of work and life" that "compare favorably with the best..."

They are asked also to provide training and education for black workers and a degree of job security, and to "adopt business practices which enhance the development of black business".

U.S. companies are less concerned by the content of SA investment rules than by the way U.S. campaigners might seek to enforce them.

If investment in post-apartheid SA entails bureaucratic and political hassles at home, many executives insist they will shun the country.

However, a senior World Bank official at the conference predicted that once an ANC government was in power, it would be so anxious to create employment that the investment code question would become moot.

A more serious deterrent for U.S. companies might be the SA- American Business Council, established in October by TransAfrica director Randall Robinson and ANC U.S. lobbyist, former congressman Walter Fauntroy.

The possibility that Robinson and his allies will seek to act as officially appointed gatekeepers once the sanctions era is over is a prospect many investors find intolerable.

Armcor on 'Major' Arms Export Drive

*MB1611135692 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1240 GMT 16 Nov 92*

[By Sipke de Vries]

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 16 SAPA—South Africa's giant arms procurement and arms manufacturing agency, Armcor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa], has embarked on a major export drive in the face of expected defence budget cuts and diminishing demand from its main client—the South African Defence Force. This was made clear by Armcor chief executive Tielman de Waal at Monday's [16 November] official opening of the five-day Defence Exposition of South Africa (Dexsa) in Johannesburg's National Exhibition Centre.

With arms exports averaging R[and]500 million annually over the past five years, there was no reason why these export earnings could not be doubled or even trebled as long as "we produce at the right price and at the right time," Mr de Waal said. At the exhibition, organised by Armcor, South Africa displayed a range of armaments from its 56-ton Elephant Mk-1B tank, and an Israeli Merkava main battle tank look-alike.

Included in the 1,500 items of military hardware, valued at R400 million on show, included the Puma helicopter missile-gunship and the huge armoured G5 ammunition carrier [as received]. Mr. de Waal said that among the military hardware unveiled for the first time were high-speed target drones which could be used as anti-aircraft training targets, hand-held 40mm grenade launchers, and a radar-guided 35mm anti-aircraft gun system.

Local manufacturers also showed adaptability with gun turret and platform designs. These allowed locally-designed and manufactured gun turrets to be fitted on foreign-made weapon carriers or, vice-versa, locally designed carrier platforms which could accommodate former Soviet block-manufactured light anti-aircraft guns.

In its quest for foreign customers, Armcor was targeting African countries, South America and countries in the Middle- and Far East, Mr. de Waal said. "Although

Armcor looks at conflict—or potential conflict—areas to expand its market, the main point of concern remains our potential clients' financial ability to pay for our products," Mr. de Waal said.

Among the 200 foreign guests invited to Dexsa were at least three foreign cabinet ministers, as well as a number of heads of defence and air forces. Mr. de Waal declined to identify the foreign guests however, except to say they came from 46 countries.

Mr. de Waal said a change of government in South Africa would not necessarily affect the local arms industry as the industry remained an important foreign currency earner and "stood in the service of all". He stressed Armcor's interest in African customers. At present they accounted for between R50- to R100 million in annual armaments sales abroad, and "because as part of Africa we understand them and they understand us".

Mr. de Waal said Armcor would be willing to award local licence manufacturing contracts abroad if such requests were made. He also expected multi-national and bi-lateral arms production programmes to be set up within two to three. [sentence as received]

In the past decade Armcor has held six armaments exhibitions abroad, four in Chile, one in Greece and one in Turkey.

Auditor General Interviewed on Homelands

*MB1611133392 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network
in English 1815 GMT 15 Nov 92*

[Interview with South African Auditor General Peter Wronsley by South African Broadcasting reporters John Bishop and Freek Robinson, on the Agenda program—live]

[Text] [Bishop] Well, a scandal was in the air during the past week. Two commissions of inquiry have revealed corruption, fraud and mismanagement of millions of rands of taxpayers' money over several years in the homelands of Lebowa and kwaNdebele. Tonight we probe government responsibility. Where does that buck stop? Before we talk to the auditor general, Mr. Peter Wronsley, our political correspondent Lester Venter reports on how the money transfers to the homelands actually take place.

[Venter] The South African Government gives the money that it raises from you and me in taxes to the homeland governments. The independent states: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, also known as the TBVC states, get their money through the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The six self-governing, or semi-independent states, get theirs through a new department called Regional and

Land Affairs. It used to be the Department of Development Aid, but that department was recently found to be so corrupt and incompetent, that President de Klerk abolished it entirely.

The form of the aid is along the old style of budgetary aid. Once the money is in the hands of the homeland government, it decides, because it is independent, on how to spend the money through its various departments. It's not unknown for the homelands government to run out during the budgeted year, and come knocking on the South African treasury door for more.

Theoretically, South Africa cannot interfere in the independent states affairs after it has given the money. In reality though, because of the failings in the system, some of the homelands have been subjected to what has been called structural adjustment programs. It means monitoring. Transkei and Ciskei have fallen into this group, and now, of course, after this week's disclosures, Lebowa.

Let's look at the sort of money we're talking about. These are the amounts given in the government's estimates of expenditure for 1991-92, that is, this year's budget: [Following table indicated by graphic on screen, all amounts in rands]

Gazankulu:	774 million
KaNgwane:	413 million
KwaNdebele:	334 million
KwaZulu:	2,737 million
Lebowa:	1,578 million
QwaQwa:	313 million
TOTAL:	6,160 million
TBVC States:	3,552 million

These figures are for the six self-governing states. You can see that kwaZulu and Lebowa are the biggest recipients. The total here is about 6,100 million rands, and 6,552 million is the amount given through foreign affairs to the independent TBVC states.

To give you an idea of the relative scales, the total amounts to something substantially over 10 percent of the national budget, which is about what developed nations spend on education.

[Bishop] Now with me live, Mr. Peter Wronsley, the auditor general. Welcome Mr. Wronsley.

[Wronsley] Thank you.

[Bishop] From our reports, you warned about maladministration in those homelands for years. Who ignored those warnings?

[Wronsley] In the first instance, our reports are submitted to the legislatures of the self-governing countries. Primarily, they are then responsible for taking action. If the statement has been correctly made by Minister Jacob

de Villiers and others, that once the transfer payment has been made, the responsibility for maladministration falls to that particular legislature, but one must also bear in mind the first line of defense in all those countries is the so-called accounting officer or head of department. He's the one that is responsible for keeping order, fiscal order, and our reports concern his management of those funds. We don't have executive powers, we report to that legislature if there's inaction or no action. Basically it is the legislature that must take the rap for that.

[Bishop] So you're saying the money leaves the South African coffers, ends up in the homelands, responsibility is, homeland leader and officials.

[Wronsley] Basically yes, but I've also seen fit in the last year or so, to report this deteriorating situation in those countries to our Parliament in Cape Town as a matter of general interest. In my report for 1991, I mentioned the fact that the amount of a billion rands in that year had in fact been transferred, and that we were having great trouble auditing many of it because of the non-submission of financial statements.

[Bishop] You mean fiddling, or what...

[Wronsley interrupting] No, just non-submission of [changes thought]. In a number of these cases, audit has not been able to furnish what is known as an audit opinion because in a number of cases the books have never been submitted for auditing, and that is one of the main problems over there. To determine responsibility, you must first go through the books, and in many cases these books are years behind. That's our main problem.

[Bishop] But what about the other side of it, Mr. Wronsley, why did the South African Government permit this to go on? I mean, the money starts here and ends up over there, isn't it?

[Wronsley] This is a political question and as an officer of Parliament I'm not here to debate the political rights and wrongs of the thing, but the system works that way. The transfer payments are made. Once the transfer payments have been made, the South African Government making that transfer payment is no longer accountable to our Parliament. I believe it's a weak system. I have actually suggested in numbers of forums that although that is a correct exposition of the law, that one can, on the principle of he who pays the piper calls the tune, that in subsequent financial years you can exert pressure through the withholding of funds. That has not yet been done, I presume for good and sufficient political reason, which is really outside my field. That is possibly one way of exerting pressure, but it's not being done.

[Bishop] We have some politicians waiting to be interviewed, so we...

[Wronsley interrupting] You will have to address them.

[Bishop] What about another fiscal question, though? I mean, 1967 you noticed the rot, that's when it began? You all involved?

[Wronsley] Well, in point of fact, no...

[Bishop, interrupting] So, what I'm saying is, how much do you think has been maladministered since 1967?

[Wronsley] It's difficult to say, but if you take it that on average over the years, let us say to the six self-governing territories, it's varied from probably about 3.5 to 6 to where it is now of the order of 6, perhaps over those four or five years you may be talking of 15, 16 thousand million rands. But one cannot say that its all been maladministered, we must be careful about that. The extent of the maladministration may be considerably less, and that is something that I can't, I haven't got my reports before me here, but it's not all maladministered. One must be careful of that.

[Bishop] Last question. Competency, main problem in those homelands?

[Wronsley] I think the lack of competence on fiscal matters is the main problem. There's also a lack of vigilance, I think, of the voting public in those particular countries.

[Bishop] Not supervising their politicians?

[Wronsley] I believe they should take a more...

[Bishop interrupting] Be careful, Mr. Wronsley, you're going into political area here.

[Wronsley] I'm retiring shortly.

[Bishop] All right, well, we're not at the moment. It's time to go across to Freek who certainly has got some political questions for you.

[Robinson] Thank you John, I must actually do my interview on the basis of what Mr. Wronsley has said here now. Excuse me, Mr. Wronsley, for asking you this one, I just want to clear up this matter. Your own officials have been involved in auditing the books in the homelands. Is that true?

[Wronsley] That's right. All six of them, I am the auditor, and my men are there, and I'll hasten to add that our auditing has also not always been of the required standard, partly because of lack of staff—locally recruited staff—partly because of the pressure on our own by commissions of inquiry.

[Robinson] You know that in the report of the De Meyer Commission, fingers were pointed at seconded officials. Were any of those officials your officials?

[Wronsley] No, in fact in chapter 3 of the De Meyer report, in fact, I think it's page 23, paragraph 1.2 if you want to be specific. The De Meyer Commission actually thanks us for our assistance, that without them they would not have been able to do the job.

[Robinson] The question is therefore, you knew all along through feedback from your officials that there was some rot?

[Wronsley] Yes, but I'm at pains to point out that an auditor doesn't do a 100 percent audit. There were very likely things that were discovered by De Meyer which would not have been part of our audit. We don't have a finger on everything.

[Robinson] Could I just ask you this one more question, Mr. Wronsley? Can you categorically state, therefore, that you had no responsibility whatsoever over the books of those homelands?

[Wronsley] We must be careful. There's a concept of accountability, which is defined in the exchequer and auditor... [changes thought] the head of department is responsible. I have to audit his books. My responsibility is to place those irregularities and unauthorized actions which we find before the legislative assembly of that area. Now, to the best of our knowledge, we've done that. It has been the reaction to those reports that has been lacking.

[Robinson] So you did expect more action from the South African Government?

[Wronsley] No, you must be careful there, I didn't say that. I said that the legislative body of that particular homeland is the first one [5-second break in transmission] the one where possibly action might be taken, but that is a political decision outside my province.

[Robinson] Thank you, Mr. Wronsley.

ANC's Jordan's Position Paper on Strategy

MB1411143192 Johannesburg NEW NATION in English 13-19 Nov 92 pp 14, 15

[“Edited Version” of paper by ANC National Working Committee member Pallo Jordan]

[Text]

1. Introduction

Since the adoption of the document “ANC [African National Congress] Strategy and Tactics” by the Morogoro Conference of 1969 the ANC has held the view that the contradiction between the colonised Black majority and the White oppressor state is the most visible and dominant within South Africa. It has further argued that this contradiction cannot be solved by the colonial state “reforming itself out of existence,” and consequently, only struggle to overthrow the system of colonial domination could lead to the resolution of this contradiction. Moreover, it has been the ANC view that since the colonial state and the colonised people cannot be spatially separated, there is no possibility of the two co-existing. This necessarily means that the struggle must result in the destruction of the colonial state. This thesis, generally described as the theory of Colonialism of a Special Type (CST), has been the core the ANC-led alliance's strategic approach to the liberation struggle.

There is now a perceptible shift in thinking on these basic strategic questions amongst some of us. This is in fact not a thought-out process, let alone the outcome of agreement within the leading bodies of the movement. It is better described as a change of gear among some of the leadership. They have canvassed their view of the current situation, without benefit of any discussion in the fora of the movement, in public sources. While their right to do this is not in question, the wisdom of such an undertaking at a time when unity is essential for contesting power with the De Klerk regime can be questioned.

This gear change became evident during an NWC (ANC National Working Committee) meeting during the last week of October, when we were called upon to discuss a document titled "Strategic perspective."

"Strategic Perspective," in its rhetoric, does not depart from the strategic objectives of the movement, once read it becomes clear that the logic of the paper is a fundamental departure from those objectives. Because there is no explicit statement denoting such a departure, it shall be my task in this paper to demonstrate the departure by dissecting the internal logic of the "Strategic Perspective" document.

1.0. The Stated Premise of the Paper

The central flaw in the paper is to be found in its fifth section. Here the authors suggest that there is an objective basis for cooperation between the De Klerk regime and the ANC-led alliance.

The basis of such cooperation is the mutual need for each other "to move the peace process forward." They assert that a relationship of cooperation and competition has been imposed on the ANC alliance and the De Klerk government by the "balance of forces."

The authors invoke the movement's acceptance of the need for an Interim Government of National Unity (IG) to give credence to a point suggesting that the IG is premised on the assessment of the objective character of the "balance of forces" they have previously presented.

Firstly, the notion of an IG was never premised on a balance of forces that made it a political necessity. The IG derives from our Harare Declaration.

I strongly contest the assertion of an objective basis for cooperation between the regime and the ANC alliance.

The dominant aspect of our relationship with the De Klerk regime is that of opposition.

The reality is that the regime's objective—however defined—is to retain the essentials of White power—i.e. the accumulated, palpable privileges that the Whites, as a dominant racial group, enjoy in terms of ownership and control of the decisive sectors of productive property; domination of the professions and higher levels of skill; the control of the commercial and financial sectors of the economy; access to the best facilities in terms of

education; access to and domination of the civil service; control over the decisive organs of the state. While quite prepared to make room for Blacks to enter the political domain, the regime is determined to so condition what power the majority acquire that it will frustrate any attempts to tamper with these essentials of White power.

The ANC alliance, on the other hand, has the national liberation of the most oppressed and exploited as its central objective. This necessarily includes the dismemberment of the racist state as a priority. In other words, to directly tamper precisely with one of the core institutions sustaining White power.

Objectively, the relationship between the ANC alliance and the regime is conflictual. The conflictual nature of the relationship is structured by the diametrically opposed interests the two represent.

1.1. The Elevation of Negotiations

Negotiations, cannot and will never be a strategy in any political conflict—whether the conflict be between states, classes, nations or oppressor and oppressed. Negotiation is an aspect of a strategy.

The attempt to elevate negotiations to the level of strategy is fundamentally flawed and betrays a misunderstanding of negotiations.

Since a transfer of power to the oppressed cannot co-exist with the retention of power by the oppressor, it is a final showdown. Historically the ANC's strategy was to harness every conceivable instrument of struggle into a multi-pronged offensive which would draw the broadest front of opposition to the apartheid regime into active struggle. In these terms, the ANC always posed its objectives as the seizure of power.

At no time, since 1969, did the ANC ever elevate any one of the prongs above the others, though it was understood that there would be moments when one of other prong might acquire a higher profile than the others. (For example, during the 1984-86 mass uprisings, when mass struggle acquired a profile over and above the others). It was understood that the thrust of ANC strategy was to knit these prongs together through mutual reinforcement, so as to merge them into one huge current, culminating in the overthrow of the racist regime.

Even while we pursued the four pillars of our strategy, the ANC never excluded negotiations as an aspect of its strategy. When they seriously came on to the agenda the ANC said negotiations are a terrain of struggle, no different from the others. Implicit in this was the understanding that negotiations is neither a tactic nor a strategy but an aspect of strategy. As such, its relative weight is far lower than that of the four major prongs of strategy. They feature as a subsidiary means for the realisation of the objectives pursued through strategy. Hence the ANC never saw any contradiction between negotiations and waging the armed struggle. Which is what "Strategic Perspective" implies! Equally, we saw no

contradiction between continuing either underground work or mass political mobilisation and negotiations.

In the case of the national liberation struggle, one or other party to the dispute must go under. Negotiations, in such a situation, are aimed at the liquidation of one of the antagonists as a factor in politics.

1.2. In section 2 (the document's authors) confuse non-violent struggle with negotiations. The ANC alliance resorted to arms when all avenues of non-violent struggle vanished, not when the possibility for negotiations vanished.

The unstated premises (that non-violent struggle and negotiations are synonymous) not only raises negotiations to the strategy, but by so doing suggests that everything else, all other prongs and aspects of strategy, must merge into this dominant thrust, negotiations, to which they are all subordinated.

This has far-reaching consequences for the ANC's entire approach to the liberation struggle. We are encountering a fundamental revision of the ANC's conception of struggle as consisting of mutually supportive prongs.

The danger is that by elevating one aspect of strategy above the others, the ANC would in fact be stripped of crucial instruments of policy.

The unwarranted elevation of negotiations to the ANC's primary strategy has the unfortunate outcome of re-orienting the movement away from confrontation with the enemy to a search for common ground. "Strategic Perspective" exudes a desperation to discover such common ground at all costs, rather than discovering ways of enhancing the growing confidence of the mass of the oppressed as the agency of their own liberation. It advises the ANC to discover new ways of facilitating communication between its leadership and the regime. Amazingly, this is seen as a "breakthrough." The harm this can inflict on the movement is already evidenced by the confused signals which have emanated from the NEC—its oscillation between militancy and complacency.

1.3. Trapping Our Victories in the Jaws of Defeat

It would seem we all agree that it was the combined impact of the many prongs of ANC strategy that compelled the enemy to seek negotiations. Quite correctly, we claim that as a victory. We proceeded from there and said the challenge facing the ANC was to skillfully employ negotiations to expedite the transfer of power from the enemy. This has been a process characterised by an ebb and flow, forwards and backwards. We have however, been able to marshal both internal pressure, through mass mobilisation, which has in turn generated international pressures, plus the pressure arising from this indecisive inter-regnum (e.g. a continuing investors' strike) to force the regime to yield. Thus we characterised our unprecedented mass action as a victory!

There is consensus in the NWC that the ANC alliance can win at the negotiations table only that which it has secured through struggle. In other words, the struggle, which continues with negotiations as one of its aspects, is the factor in determining the balance of forces.

It is this movement that stands at the head of a series of victories, which every NWC member claims to recognise, which is now being advised to act in the following manner:

1.3.1. The regime has put forward a Constitutional Plan that seeks to make power-sharing mandatory and coalition governments, in which it has a decisive voice, constitutionally compulsory. The "Strategic Perspective" document advises that we comply by accommodating the regime for a while—three years, five years? seven years? 10 years?

1.3.2. The regime wishes to retain its security services, shield them against possible prosecution now or in the future, integrate the members of MK (and possibly APLA) as subordinates in the security services. The "Strategic Perspective" advises us to comply.

1.3.3. The regime wants to retain the essentials of the colonial administration it has run since 1910, to provide sheltered employment for incompetent and badly trained Afrikaners and other Whites from the lower middle strata, continue with feather-bedding and grossly inflated, wasteful bureaucracies, permit them to waste, squander and embezzle taxpayers' monies. Such strategically placed persons would also have the capacity to thwart every democratic reform the democratic state wishes to implement. The "Strategic Perspective" advises us to comply.

1.3.4. The regime would like the boundaries, powers and the configuration of future regions to be determined outside the Constituent Assembly. Its purpose, to try to ensure that it can gerrymander boundaries that will advantage it and its allies. The "Strategic Perspective" says we should accommodate them.

1.4 There appears to be a deep-seated pessimism that runs through the entire document. True, as the document says, we have not defeated the regime. But neither has the regime defeated us!

1.5. These measures, which would amount to capitulation to some of the core objectives pursued by the regime, we are advised to adopt as a hedge against the destabilisation of democracy by the SADF [South African Defense Force] and SAP [South African Police] and the racist civil service.

If, as the authors seem to fear, the officer corps and ranks of the SADF and SAP are likely to be opponents of a democratic order, I would have thought that underlined the need to have them vacate these strategically important posts as soon as possible.

The gravest danger to a transition and the democratic order is precisely such potential fifth columnists. Every

repressive military formation that has been coddled by the democratic forces has not had its teeth drawn, instead it has taken courage from such leniency.

I find it alarming that the authors seem to think that the motivating factor in the action of potentially subversive civil servants is their individual pensions, job security and perks. If they act, they will act as a corporate body, on behalf of their perceived interest as a group and appeals to individual benefits accruing from loyalty will be seen for what they are—attempts at bribery to desert their side.

The dictates of austerity alone—leave aside politics—would compel a democratic state to take a very sharp axe to the bloated bureaucracy.

2.0. The Issue of Violence

I have often questioned the realistic prospect of the regime embarking on serious negotiations, in the full realisation that their inevitable result must be the loss of power. I have consequently insisted that the alliance must take seriously De Klerk's words that he seeks to reach an accommodation about sharing power, and not to surrender power.

In other words, the regime would like to arrive at a formula that would make possible the co-existence of CST and democracy. I am, consistent with ANC strategic thinking up till now, convinced that such co-existence is impossible, that democracy requires the uprooting of CST.

De Klerk's strategy—a mix of reformism, coupled with the systematic destabilisation of the ANC alliance—has as its immediate objective rendering the ANC too weak to resist such a compromise.

Contrary to what some, including the authors of "Strategic Perspective" appear to think, there is no contradiction between reformism and the "informal repression" that the De Klerk regime is employing.

It is clear that its broad parameters are the outcome of collective decision. De Klerk's demonstrated unwillingness to do anything to stop the violence can have no other explanation.

The authors inexplicably treat the SADF and the SAP as if these are autonomous players and not parts of the state machinery De Klerk uses against us.

The De Klerk regime obviously has not come to terms with the inevitable outcome of serious negotiations. It has not arrived at the seminal political decision that it must give up power. The violence betrays that; its negotiations positions betrays that; its clinging to its alliance with the IFP [Inkatha Freedom Party] betrays that.

3.0. Happy Trails to You or Riding into the Sunset Together?

The ANC alliance and the regime both decided to explore negotiations, but with diametrically opposed immediate and long-term objectives. This opposition is rooted in the fundamental contradiction of our society.

The national liberation project includes not only the creation of a democratic state, but crucially, the dismemberment of the racist state, its coercive arms—the army, police, the law courts, the prisons and its persuasive arm—the civil administration, civil service, the state ideological apparatus (like SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation], schools, etc). These organs of White minority state power, we are now being told, should not be tampered with.

Such an option, I submit, will permanently block the path to any meaningful change in this country. We would by choosing such a course to do two things. We would keep in place a civil service that has no interest in serving the mass of the oppressed who are the ANC's constituency; keeping in place a civil service that will do everything to undermine the democratic government; and at the same time keeping under arms the agency that can ensure that the democratic state dare not touch that civil service when its disloyalty is uncovered. A national liberation movement that did that would not be riding into the sunset, it would be building its own funeral pyre! Not only does that option lead to a dead-end, it is suicidal!

Negotiations is a key aspect of ANC strategy at this time. No one in the ANC wants to see them fail. While we will not get at the table what we have not won on other fronts, we should be equally careful not to give away what we have won on those fronts at the negotiating table. I fear "Strategic Perspective" is a prescription to do that. This attempt to revise the ANC's strategic perspective form a composite whole, linked by a radically misguided conception of what is possible in the present. It must resolve itself in a perspective that projects or accommodates the piecemeal eradication of the substantive elements of CST—a reformist perspective!

Unfortunately, it does not work! Look at the history of social democracy!

ANC's Jordan Calls Concessions 'Capitulation'

MB1311191692 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 13-19 Nov 92 pp 8, 9

["Extract" of response from ANC head of information and publicity Pallo Jordan to Joe Slovo concession proposals: "Committing suicide by concession"]

[Text] There appears to be a deep-seated pessimism that runs through Joe Slovo's proposals. True, we have not defeated the regime. But neither has the regime defeated us. The thrust of the document suggests that we are suing for the best terms we can get from a victorious enemy.

These measures, which would amount to capitulation to some of the core objectives pursued by the regime at this time, we are advised to adopt as a hedge against the destabilisation of democracy by the South African Defence Force [SADF], the South African Police [SAP] and the racist civil service. If, as the authors seem to fear, the officer corps and ranks of the SADF and SAP are likely to be opponents of a democratic order, I would have thought that underlined the need to have them vacate these strategically important posts as soon as possible. The gravest danger to a transition and the democratic order is precisely such fifth columnists.

It is foolhardy to imagine that a democratic state will contain subversion by the racist civil service by giving guarantees about pensions, job security, and perks. If they act they will act as a corporate body on behalf of their perceived interest as a group and appeals to individual benefits accruing from loyalty will be seen for what they are—attempts at bribery to desert their side. The authors also seem to have no appreciation of the feather-bedding and wastefulness of the incumbent regime. Once we factor in considerations of competence, honesty, public service ethos and loyalty to the democratic political order the case becomes hopeless. The imperatives of good government—which our posters boldly proclaim our people should vote for—would dictate that we take a very sharp axe to the civil service.

I have often questioned the realistic prospect of the regime embarking on serious negotiations in the full realisation that their inevitable result must be the loss of power. I have consequently insisted that the alliance must take seriously De Klerk's words that he seeks to reach an accommodation about sharing power, and not to surrender power.

De Klerk's strategy—a mix of reformism coupled with the systematic destabilisation of the ANC [African National Congress] alliance—has as its immediate objective rendering the ANC too weak to resist such a compromise. There is ample evidence that the SADF, the overt and covert security forces, assisted by a range of irregulars and freelance auxiliaries, have been assigned the task of continuing the counter-insurgency war.

Contrary to what some, including the authors of "Strategic Perspective" appear to think, there is no contradiction between reformism and the informal repression that the De Klerk regime is employing. It is clear that its broad parameters are the outcome of collective decision. De Klerk's demonstrated unwillingness to do anything to stop the violence can have no other explanation.

The De Klerk regime obviously has not come to terms with the inevitable outcome of serious negotiations. It has not arrived at the seminal political decision that it must give up power. The violence betrays that; its negotiations position betrays that; its clinging to its alliance with the Inkatha Freedom Party betrays that.

It has been suggested by one of the sources of inspiration of Strategic Perspectives that the sort of compromises

that the movement should make are such as will not undermine its strategic objectives or subvert the achievement of national liberation. The ANC alliance and the regime both decided to explore the path of negotiations with diametrically opposed immediate and long-term objectives. This opposition is rooted in the fundamental contradiction of our society.

The national liberation project includes not only the creation of a democratic state, but crucially, the dismemberment of the racist state. The central components of the state are its coercive arms and its persuasive arm. It is precisely these organs of white minority state power that we are now being told should not be tampered with, so as to enable the liberation movement and the regime to ride blissfully into the sunset together. Such an option will permanently block the path to any meaningful change in this country. We would by choosing such a course do two things. We would keep in place a civil service that has no interest in serving the mass of the oppressed who are the ANC's constituency; keeping in place a civil service that will do everything to undermine the democratic government; and at the same time keeping under arms the agency that can ensure that the democratic state dare not touch that civil service when its disloyalty is uncovered.

A national liberation movement that does that is not riding into the sunset, it would be building its own funeral pyre.

'Rumblings of Discontent' in MK Viewed

MB1411062192 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 13-19 Nov 92 pp 4, 5

[Report by Philippa Garson: "The volatile cocktail of Umkhonto's disillusioned soldiers"]

[Text] The rumblings of discontent in the ranks of Umkhonto weSizwe [Spear of the Nation; ANC military wing; MK] are turning into an all-out crisis for the African National Congress [ANC].

Former MK chief of staff Chris Hani admitted this week that the problems arising from the growing disenchantment of returned MK soldiers had the "potential to explode" in the absence of a speedy political solution. And current MK chief Siphwe Nyanda said he was surprised more MK returnees had not turned to crime.

The problem was confirmed this week in interviews with MK cadres who now live in the Vaal. Instead of returning to the country in a glorious blaze of victory, the cadres have trickled back to an ignoble fate of poverty and obscurity: in the eyes of many in the movement they are no more than an embarrassing refugee problem.

They have emerged from the bush in neighbouring countries to face a barrage of hardships: economic recession, unemployment, hostile security forces, the cold shoulder from many ANC internal leaders guarding their

posts in regional and branch structures and little recognition for their efforts in exile.

Little wonder that some alienated, cash-strapped MK cadres are turning to crime, drink and hijacking self-defence units for gangster purposes, while others are finding the outstretched hands of the police and Inkatha—with offers of houses and money in return for Askari-type activities—very attractive.

Commented Hani: "It would be dishonest on my part to say there is no problem. It's important for all of us, particularly in the leadership, to recognise the enormity of the problem." Nyanda said he was surprised that many more cadres had not reverted to complete lawlessness, given the mountain of problems facing them.

According to research conducted by the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, at least 34 MK cadres have been gunned down over the past two years and scores of others have been harassed and assaulted. As a result, many cadres live an aimless life, moving from one place to another to avoid being targeted.

A commission, headed by ANC deputy general-secretary Jacob Zuma and including MK cadres, is looking into the crisis and the future role of MK. Training in conventional warfare is taking place in Tanzania and Uganda in preparation for the integration of MK into a new army. However, strict educational requirements rule out the participation of many MK soldiers. Those leaving for military training tend to be new recruits rather than MK returnees who either don't qualify or do not relish going back to the camps where they spent many frustrating years impatiently waiting for missions.

"Life in exile was not a bed of roses. MK soldiers in the camps and in the bushes had the toughest time," said Hani.

He stressed that the crisis could not be adequately addressed until an interim government of national unity was in place. However, steps could be taken: "We have to improve the lines of communication, identify these people, find out where they are and foster a sense of belonging. We must take political steps to save these comrades from further demoralisation and alienation...this way we will arrest the tendency to move towards gangsterism and crime...after all, they gave the people hope to fight in the country—knowing they had an army in exile."

Hani urged MK members to get involved in self-defence units [SDUs] and by imparting knowledge and skills, so earn the respect of their communities. "MK is not a recipe for leadership. Leadership is achieved in the course of struggle. It is not thrust upon you."

A group of unemployed MK returnees in the Vaal voiced their grievances this week.

"We have been left in the lurch," said "Vusi". "The ANC can no longer support us."

"When we were told of the suspension of the armed struggle, the general feeling was one of disenchantment," said "Dume". Most, if not all, MK combatants were still ready to engage the enemy militarily...but now they will tell you a different story. That militancy has dwindled.

Pouring over recent press reports of corruption in the National Co-ordinating Committee on Repatriation, the soldiers expressed outrage at the fact that their stipends have all but dried up or disappeared into the hands of "greedy administrators". Most MK cadres have not received the full compliment of their R[Rand]800 a month stipend, to be handed out over a six-month period.

"The ANC is strapped for cash," said Nyande. "Now cadres feel that the ANC had neglected them. They don't have money to feed themselves."

After an MK conference in Venda last year, cadres asked to help run the self-defence units. They were also instructed to help build the political strength of the ANC.

But Nyanda described a growing frustration over the lack of ammunition for SDUs. "They may help in building barracks but they feel vulnerable without the means to protect themselves."

The Vaal group said that they and other cadres in their area were reluctant to get involved in SDUs beyond the level of consultation. Attacks orchestrated by undisciplined youths, they said, were often badly planned and arbitrary, exposing them to the perils of police crack-downs in a messy war with many enemies and few rules.

At a press conference this week, Vaal representatives of the ANC alliance acknowledged that SDUs in the area were running amok: "We are alarmed that certain individuals, who claim allegiance to the ANC and its allies, are acting completely outside the mandate and policies of these organisations."

The communities in Vaal townships were disappointed with MK's hesitancy to get involved in SDUs. "We were highly revered when we returned," said "Dume". "We were looked upon as their saviours, particularly in the light of Inkatha and security force attacks. But we couldn't just act impulsively. We are being hunted every day."

"They now see us as cowardly, but we are political soldiers. We follow orders. And the order of the day is loud and clear—ceasefire."

They spend their time hankering after their days abroad and waiting for the moment when a political settlement will lead to their integration into a new army. "We are convinced that negotiations are not yielding any positive results. They are just dragging on and on. Whatever happens in those talks—let there be results. Particularly in MK there must be changes. We have highly trained MK cadres who are just roaming the streets. We are not

that concerned about who is going to be the next president. We just want our future participation in the army ensured—that it where we belong."

While many MK cadres have been absorbed into regional structures, others complain that leaders who rose to prominence in the United Democratic Front era are clutching on to their positions, leaving no space for the returnees. They say they have been marginalised by "civilians waiting in the wings for power" who are trying to defuse the militancy of the ANC as they move closer to a negotiated settlement with the National Party.

The recent attempted assassination of Vaal activist Bavumile Vilikazi was perhaps testimony to such frustration. Many MK soldiers have accused Vilikazi of "blocking positions for them". Though the ANC announced last week that an SDU member had confessed to attacking Vilikazi (who he claimed to have mistaken for a policeman), other sources gave a different story, reporting that the culprit was an MK member who acted out of revenge rather than ignorance.

Hani attributes the confusion and alienation expressed by many MK cadres to the failure of the ANC to reorientate the cadres to the "new reality" of struggle—from the goal of military solution to negotiated settlement.

"Unlike the classical colonial situation, the ANC came back into the country not as a movement about to take over government but one which was to continue the struggle under new conditions—from a movement which fought the struggle in underground, illegal conditions to a movement which had to wage the struggle openly and legally."

"What became key was building mass-based organisations again, to empower the ANC and its allies in the process of negotiation....in my own view we must accept that we did not embark on political orientation."

Those leaders who rose to prominence in the UDF [United Democratic Front] and mass democratic movement of the 1980s were well-versed in the skills of mass mobilisation. They were also educated, particularly those who spent years in prison.

Many exiles, including some in MK, completed courses in host countries like the Soviet Union, East Germany and Cuba. But most MK soldiers returned with only the most basic skills in guerrilla warfare.

"We never fathomed the potency of the internal struggle here," said Hani. "The MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] produced outstanding comrades who, graduating under conditions of illegality, now occupy that legal space. There has been a feeling that those of us outside were the people who really did it, instead of accepting that we did it inside too."

"The struggle inside produced its own leaders right down to regional and branch structures (which meant) we had to compete for leadership at a number of levels

with other cadres. Some of us thought we could get positions ready-made for ourselves. This was a mistake. We should have prepared our people for this sort of thing."

Many MK soldiers use weapons from arms caches to rob. Some are no strangers to gangsterism and theft, having thrown themselves into such activities in exile. Others are looking elsewhere for financial reward and recognition. Nyanda pointed to the string of MK members who have been gunned down and the murder of key Hammer Unit informant Andre de Villiers by MK members as proof that police are recruiting cadres as Askaris.

"As long as these people are dangling money they will be seduced by this. There is a desperate situation with food and shelter and people are exploiting this," said Hani.

Inkatha Freedom Party central committee member Albert Mncwango claimed that MK cadres, disgruntled with the ANC, had joined his organisation and were training their protection units. "Why shouldn't we use their skills?" he said. Neither Hani nor Nyanda ruled out this possibility. It is well-known that Pat Hlongwane and other "turned" MK soldiers from the Returned Exiles Co-ordinating Committee are with Durban-based Inkatha "warlord" Thomas Shabalala.

Hani denied South African Defence Force [SADF] allegations that MK was running training camps in Transkei to train people to fight against Inkatha in Natal. The ANC has approached the Goldstone Commission to call on the SADF to produce evidence or retract its allegations.

Nyanda also intends to sue SADF chief General Meiring unless he retracts and apologizes for alleging last week that Nyanda had issued orders for SDUs to be equipped with arms and that special MK operations teams would be set in motion.

"The suggestion that MK is training people in Transkei is ludicrous," said Hani. MK, he said, was all over the country, training SDUs. Hani admitted that relations between the Transkei Defence Force and MK were "good". "Holomisa's position is MK is legal. He receives MK and APLA officers." Hani said war-ravaged youths seeking refuge in Transkei may be approaching the TDF [Transkei Defence Force] for military training.

17 November Review of Current Events, Issues

MB1711135892

[Editorial Report]

THE STAR

Nation in 'State of Moral Paralysis'—Commenting on the "mess of corruption, lies and murder in public life," Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 17 November in a page 12 editorial believes "our present and future voters" have "simply absorbed one blow after another, showing no real will to hit back." "Should we approve

the fact that Pretoria's greatest—and virtually only—generous act of land reform was aimed at institutions linked with the Lebona government, whose gross corruption was already known to the Cabinet? Or passively accept General Eddie Webb's admission that he lied under oath to cover up CCB [Civil Cooperation Bureau] death plots? The 'inevitability' of change seems to have induced a state of moral paralysis across the nation. Those who despair of the future see no point in demanding honest government now; others are so confident of the fruits of change that they tolerate today's 'temporary' corruption. The first group invite the kind of future government they most dread; and the latter bury in advance the democratic vision of which they dream."

'Growing Role' for Democratic Party—A second editorial on the same page says Democratic Party, DP, Leader Zach de Beer "may be a bit over-optimistic" about the DP eventually governing South Africa, "but it is by no means starry-eyed to see a valuable and even a growing role for the party in a future South Africa." The DP "is making strenuous efforts to build black membership and transform its old white elitist image." Also, the Democrats "have a unique part to play as an honest broker between the larger parties, as De Beer demonstrated through his important initial role at Codesa [Convention for a Democratic South Africa]. With a larger voting base they could even—who knows?—end up in a balance-of-power situation, and in that way secure the role in government they deserve."

BUSINESS DAY

De Klerk Urged To 'Act Promptly' on Goldstone Revelations—"Unless President De Klerk acts promptly on

the Goldstone commission's disclosures yesterday of dirty tricks by the security forces, he will put his own position and the future of our country in peril," warns a page 6 editorial in Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 17 November. President De Klerk must "immediately suspend the people compromised by Goldstone's disclosures," and must "authorise the additional investigative powers Goldstone believes are necessary. That might mean bringing in independent foreign investigators to bolster the South Africans." "The longer the Cabinet deludes itself about the military's capacity to destroy our prospects for peace, the greater the danger that desperate military chiefs will take matters into their own hands."

SOWETAN

De Klerk Has 'Back To the Wall'—Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 17 November in a page 6 editorial believes President De Klerk is "a man with his back to the wall." He has vowed to continue white minority rule in South Africa indefinitely unless the African National Congress agrees to his demands for power sharing. "This is tough talk with little substance. In fact, his Government finds itself beset with problems and in a situation from which it will not be able to make any demands. Its credibility, even among its own supporters, has reached rock bottom." "All indications are that the National Party's grip on power is slipping. A rational and logical next move is for De Klerk to accede to the fundamental demand of the majority: the transfer of power to a representative, accountable and democratic government."

Angola

'Deterioration' of Relations With Zaire Noted

MB1711065292 *Luanda Radio Nacional Network*
in Portuguese 0600 GMT 17 Nov 92

[Text] The Zairian Government has recalled its ambassador to Angola for consultations. Diplomats accredited to the Zairian capital believe that the decision confirms the deterioration of bilateral relations.

The decision by the Kinshasa government follows the Angolan Government's revelation that Zairian troops have been deployed along 2 km-border in what appears to be an attempt to assist the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA]. During the 16-year-old war, the Angolan Government repeatedly accused Zaire of authorizing the flow of U.S. weapons for UNITA through its territory. Kinshasa has always denied the accusations, though investigations revealed that the war materiel for UNITA was channeled through the Kamina base in southern Zaire.

'Foreign Experts' Said at UNITA Airstrip

MB1511152492 *Luanda Radio Nacional Network*
in Portuguese 1200 GMT 15 Nov 92

[Text] Aircraft coming in from the Republic of Zaire are constantly making nightly flights over the capital of Uige Province and the city of Negage. Three helicopters recently offloaded some 50 foreign experts, who conducted work on the Quicua airstrip, in a National Union for the Total Independence of Angola-controlled area.

Angolan air space violations have also been reported in Moxico Province. Aircraft coming in from South Africa have been flying over (Luchaves) district, thereby frightening local residents.

Savimbi Reportedly in Zaire; Seeks Military Aid

MB1711070092 *Maputo Radio Mozambique Network*
in Portuguese 0600 GMT 17 Nov 92

[Text] Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA], arrived in Gabdolite on 13 November where he met President Mobutu's adviser for domestic and external security. A UN official said in Kinshasa that Savimbi was thought to have requested military assistance from the Zairian authorities.

MPLA for Establishment of Government, Parliament

MB1711095792 *Luanda Radio Nacional Network*
in Portuguese 0600 GMT 17 Nov 92

[Excerpts] The Political Bureau of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA] has recommended the rapid establishment of the sovereign organs elected at the 29-30 September polls. In a press release issued at the end of a meeting yesterday, the Political

Bureau of the party that won the elections recommended the adoption of measures to uphold the Bicesse Accords, and to guarantee the free movement of people and goods.

The press release also recommends the upholding of the law, regarding the ban on military wings of political parties. [passage omitted]

The MPLA is also in favor of a multiparty meeting attended by the parties with seats in parliament. Such a meeting, the press release says, will be designed to form a government and the future National Assembly.

Governor Says Malanje Under UNITA Siege

MB1311202692 *Luanda Radio Nacional Network*
in Portuguese 0600 GMT 13 Nov 92

[Excerpt] The Malanje Provincial capital is under siege, but the local government has taken measures to guard against possible atrocities. This was disclosed by Malanje Governor Joao Manuel Bernardo who said that the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola armed forces that were repelled from the city of Malanje are concentrated 15 km from the provincial capital for a counteroffensive.

[Begin Bernardo recording] Malanje is besieged, so to say, at this moment. We are practically encircled. They are about 15 to 20 km from the city. They carry out some incursions, but we are taking the necessary measures to repel them further away so they at least they leave us in peace. Presently, we can say that we don't have any possibilities to reach Malanje by land considering that the city of Ndalatando has also been occupied. For us that is worrisome because it has created a number of problems, though we think that the necessary measures are being taken at central level so that this situation returns to normal so that we may really carry out our duties. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Malawi

Banda Warns Muslims on Multiparty System

EA1511130892 *Blantyre Malawi Broadcasting Corporation Network* in English 1800 GMT 14 Nov 92

[Text] His Excellency the life president, Ngwazi [Paramount Chief] Dr. Kamuzu Banda, has called on Muslims throughout the country to safeguard the peace and calm, law, and order prevailing in this country. The life president was speaking at Sanjika Palace in Blantyre today when (?hence) the trustees of the Muslim Association of Malawi, regional representatives of the association, and Muslim chiefs from all over the country.

The Ngwazi said as Muslims, they are at peace with other religious groups in the country, which he said, is not the case in other parts of Africa and the world. For this reason, the life president said Muslims should value the tranquility that is prevailing in this country. He advised them not to be misled by dissidents, who he said would

easily incite sectarian violence in the country. The life president said he was glad that they, as representatives of the Muslim community in the country, had called on him to reassure him of their support and disassociate themselves from the activities of some dissidents who are members of pressure groups.

At this point, his excellency the life president advised them not to allow anyone to use their association for his or her personal political gains.

Turning to the national referendum, the life president said it is the chance for them to demonstrate to the world that they are behind him personally, the party and the government. He therefore advised them to vote for the Malawi Congress Party in the referendum and reject multiparty politics. The ngwazi said by so doing, they will be maintaining the political unity that has prevailed in the country for the past 28 years.

Mozambique

UN Says Special Cease-Fire Meeting 'Positive'

MB1611192792 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1900 GMT 16 Nov 92

[Text] The Mozambican Government and the Mozambique National Resistance [Renamo] have undertaken to order their military commands not to move their forces, and to explain to them what is an actual violation [words indistinct] the two sides agreed on this during a special meeting of the Cease-Fire Commission in Maputo today. The meeting was chaired by Lieutenant Colonel Sinha, commander of the UN forces in Mozambique.

Speaking to newsmen after the meeting, Lt. Col. Sinha described it as positive and added all pending questions had been settled [words indistinct] will discuss the Investigation Commission's report on alleged violations by both sides.

Renamo Says No Need For Zimbabwe Troops

MB1611133192 Johannesburg Radio South Africa Network in English 1100 GMT 16 Nov 92

[Text] Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] says nothing can justify the continued presence of Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique, since all foreign soldiers should have left the country by now in terms of the peace accord.

Reports from Maputo say Zimbabwe has not withdrawn any of its 5,000 soldiers from Mozambique, only heavy military equipment from the Limpopo and Beira corridors. Journalists say there has been a delay in the withdrawal of foreign troops because there are not enough United Nations observers to supervise the implementation of the peace accord.

Assembly Points Announced in Northern Provinces

MB1411095892 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 0800 GMT 14 Nov 92

[Text] Thirteen assembly points for government and Mozambique National Resistance [Renamo] troops have been identified and announced in Mozambique's northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nam-pula. According to NOTICIAS newspaper, this was revealed by the head of the UN military observer team in the northern area. Out of 13 assembly points, seven are for government forces and the remaining six for Renamo. He also said the named sites could be altered, according to subsequent working conditions, but noted that the number of those areas will not be altered.

Namibia

Malaysia's Mahathir Arrives on Visit

BK1611155692 Kuala Lumpur Radio Malaysia Network in English 1330 GMT 16 Nov 92

[Excerpt] Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir Mohamed has arrived in Windhoek for a five-day official visit to Namibia to enhance bilateral ties and promote South-South relations. The prime minister's entourage includes his wife, Datuk Sri Datin Paduka Dr. Siti Hasmah; Primary Industries Minister Datuk Sri Dr. Lim Keng Yaik; and Central Bank Governor Tan Sri Jaafar Hussein.

Namibia is the first stop for the prime minister on his three-nation African visit. He is scheduled to attend the G-15 summit of developing countries in Senegal on the 21st and 22d of this month before going north for a three-day visit to Tunisia. [passage omitted listing Mahathir's itinerary]

Zimbabwe

Iranian Embassy-Organized Public Prayers Banned

MB1311195992 Johannesburg Channel Africa Radio in English 1600 GMT 13 Nov 92

[Text] The Zimbabwean Government has ordered the Iranian Embassy in Harare to stop organizing public Moslem prayers. Zimbabwean Foreign Affairs Minister Nathan Shamuyarira told the embassy that the practice could encourage Moslem fundamentalism.

The Iranian Embassy recently organized a public meeting to pray for rain. The meeting, attended by several diplomats, was broadcast on local television news programs.

Mr. Shamuyarira was quoted as saying that Zimbabwe was a secular and not a religious state. Officials at the Iranian Embassy have refused to comment.

Daily Reports Expenditure on Troops In Mozambique

MB1411075292 Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 5 Nov 92 p 10

[Unattributed report: "Military expenditure costly"]

[Text] The withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from Mozambique should plug the hole which military expenditure on MNR [Mozambique National Resistance] related counter-insurgency operations had pierced in the national coffers, CZI [Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries] president, Dr. Bill Moore, has said.

He said at current prices, the government was draining about \$3 million a day from the national fiscus on military operations in Mozambique, "money which should not have been spent there in the first place since the country depends on loans".

The annual expenditure had jumped from \$400 million in the early phases of Zimbabwe's intervention in the MNR war to about \$1,095 billion because of the hyper-inflationary trends in the country.

Dr. Moore said such a big drain on the country's finances, had continued to exert unbearable weight on the budget deficit and the severe illiquidity climate gripping the productive sectors.

The estimates, part of which emanated from the advanced military hardware put to use by troops in Mozambique to match the MNR, were part of the year-on-year budgetary allocations on defence which have hit \$1.3 billion.

He said if the troops were withdrawn as part of the Rome peace accord, the government should demobilise these troops, which he said posed grave political costs since "it is very difficult to put a lot of highly trained killers on to the streets when there is nothing for them to do," an exercise which would come in the wake of a cracking job base.

"It is a recipe for fomenting civil unrest but, nevertheless, we have to do it," Dr. Moore said. If the army was to be cut by half, the challenge should be to create an additional 20,650 jobs for them.

He blamed the government's fiscal and monetary policies which have been formulated in its favour and have

resulted in "its (government's) sucking away of all the cash. POSB [Post Office Savings Bank] has better rates than the building societies. Our financial sector is in disarray because the government spends too much money."

Dr. Moore said the United Nations and other related peace-keeping forces should ensure the security of the oil pipeline, the Beira and Limpopo Corridors which were being guarded by the Fifth and First brigades, respectively.

He denied that fears by the private sector about the vulnerability of the transit routes after the troops withdrawal were a shift by businessmen and industrialists from their criticism of the troops presence in Mozambique, saying "the troops should not have been there".

There was great uncertainty on whether Mr. Afonso Dhlakama would deliver the goods; whether the MNR was a cohesive body or whether it (MNR) would deteriorate into a series of independent bodies, Dr Moore said.

But he noted that peace in Mozambique should usher in a surge in crossborder investment in industry, mining, farming and tourism. The dependence of public expenditure on taxation, Dr Moore said, had reached the law of diminishing returns since people paying taxes were a very small percentage of the population.

This had resulted in large numbers of people evading tax either legally or illegally. He said the government should spread the tax base wider by changing emphasis from income tax to sale tax or VAT [Value-Added Tax].

"We need an immediate and massive revamp of the taxation system whereby tax rates and tax allowances are changed dramatically. We are coming down from 55 percent to 50 percent as a maximum tax rate. What we should be looking at is coming down to 35 percent," he said.

Dr. Moore criticised the government for granting tax-free allowances to some categories of senior civil servants while hitting hard other categories of tax payers, which amounts to an admission by the state that taxation was still high.

Ministers were insulated from tax in many respects which made them very "adamant and stubborn" on proposals to scale down the higher taxation system in the country.

Burkina Faso

Minister Seeks Approval for Liberian Force

AB1611125292 Ouagadougou Radiodiffusion Nationale du Burkina Radio in French 1900 GMT 14 Nov 92

[Excerpts] External Relations Minister Thomas Sanou was at the National Assembly on 13 November to present a report from the government on the Liberian crisis. His task was to present assemblymen with the necessary information to enable them to vote on a bill on sending a Burkinabe contingent to join the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] Cease-Fire Monitoring Group [ECOMOG] in accordance with decisions reached at the last summit of the community in Abuja. Here is Minister Sanou.

[Begin recording] The heads of state and government agreed that all ECOWAS member countries, especially those trusted by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia [NPFL], must send contingents to strengthen ECOMOG's capacity to accomplish its peacekeeping mission and to restore confidence among all the warring factions. The Government of Burkina Faso welcomed this new approach as it was full of hope. Our country, convinced about the need for a peaceful solution to the Liberian conflict, welcomed this decision, and in order to ensure the effective implementation of this joint decision, the Burkinabe Government intends sending a Burkinabe contingent to join the ECOMOG troops, if your honorable assembly agrees to this. [passage omitted] [end recording]

In fact, the Burkinabe Government's intention to send a contingent to join ECOMOG comes as a surprise to many parliamentarians. The external relations minister explains this decision.

[Begin recording] ECOMOG as it stands today has lost its credibility as far as its initial mission is concerned because it has deviated from its mission. Our present attitude stems from our desire to try to safeguard the community spirit because there is no need to hide the facts. The media have already reported on this. In Abuja we were more or less at the breaking point, and there was also the threat that ECOWAS, which was created with great pain and is the hope for subregional integration, would be sacrificed. The compromise demanded by all ECOWAS members led to the above formula. [passage omitted]

We adopted this position of compromise to restore ECOWAS' unity and also to give its mission better chances. It is on this condition, which is the only one left to be proposed, that we accepted in a spirit of compromise, the solution of restoring ECOWAS's credibility. [end recording]

Another point of concern of our deputies was the following: What made the Burkinabe Government get so involved in the Liberian crisis? What interest was it pursuing? Here is Thomas Sanou's answer.

[Begin recording] There is certainly no obvious economic interest apart from normal transactions made by our businessmen in the informal sector of that country in times of peace, as well as in the subregion. Our presence in Liberia was incidental. The first and most important factor is that our president, Blaise Compaore, was then ECOWAS chairman and so we went there initially with this idea of integration which was strongly advocated by our president at that time. He proposed that there should be subregional solutions to subregional problems. As you know, President Blaise Compaore devoted a lot of his time to this problem of integration; this is the first factor.

Second, we played host to a political refugee, who has since developed in one way or another. Of course, our sympathies toward him remained, and of course, we were somewhat interested in him in the ensuing developments. In other words, like all other countries, we believe in our capacity, as Africans, to effectively resolve African and subregional problems. Initially, we were not more involved than other countries, and one thing must be remembered here in our subregion and also in Africa in particular. I think in regard to the Liberian conflict there is a problem of leadership. We need not hide things; it must be said. Why should one country take a certain stand in a conflict and not the other? In this respect I do not need to cite those who are entrusted with actually playing quite an important role in the conflict. I think in this situation we cannot continue to think that Burkina Faso is incapable of assuming regional, continental, and other responsibilities. This, indeed, is the core of the problem. [end recording]

This crisis has been the cause of the chilling of relations between Washington and Ouagadougou. Several assemblymen expressed their concern to the external relations minister. Here is Mr. Thomas Sanou's reply.

[Begin recording] We are ready for talks, in so far as we did not take the initiative to suspend or freeze our cooperative relations with the United States. We are going to make the necessary efforts to make ourselves understood, or help in making ourselves understood, if necessary, by other partners. But in saying this there is certainly a minimum level of cooperation to maintain, and we must, at any rate, be able to safeguard this minimum cooperation with our partner, the United States. The consequences, of course, well...[Sanou changes thought] Any break in cooperative relations has positive and negative effects, but this is not the case here. I think the American Administration was concerned about this. They have, nonetheless maintained the same level of cooperation they have adopted for some years now. And as I said, this level of cooperation is relatively low after a misunderstanding which occurred around 1977-1980. We are very hopeful that these are moments of misunderstanding that will gradually fade away as we undertake concrete acts that will be assessed. [end recording]

No Burkinabese Fighters With Taylor

*LD1711102792 Paris Radio France International
in French 0630 GMT 17 Nov 92*

[Excerpt] The Burkina Faso Government has again denied remarks by the ECOMOG [Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] second in command, who said Burkinabese fighters are taking part at the side of Charles Taylor's men and facing African White Helmets [ECOMOG soldiers] around Monrovia, where fighting is taking place. Burkina Faso Foreign Minister Thomas Sanon spoke to Ghislene Dupont:

[Begin recording] [Sanon] ECOMOG reports say that there is a massive recruiting drive of mercenaries from the subregion, from Western Africa. Can it be said that there are only Burkinabese in the combat zone? We do not know. Only those making these accusations can tell us why they do so and what their evidence is.

[Dupont] So you are denying the remarks made by the ECOMOG second in command.

[Sanon] Absolutely. Once more we reject them, and we say that this is part of a rather indecent masquerade, while we are all attempting to solve the problem in a reasonable way. No later than last Monday, we asked our National Assembly to be allowed to take part in the ECOMOG, in accordance to our Constitution. This is being considered. I believe that if there were the goodwill to accept [words indistinct] sufficiently. [end recording]

Ghana

Mob Attacks NDC, NCP, Egle Party Supporters

*AB1611142592 Accra Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
Radio Network in English 0600 GMT 16 Nov 92*

[Text] Reports from Tamale say a victory procession of the Progressive Alliance of the NDC [National Democratic Congress], NCP [National Convention Party], and Egle Party ended on a sad note yesterday when their supporters were attacked by a mob, injuring 37 in the process. One Mohamed Kala had an arrow embedded in the left side of his chest while Masters Rachid Yakubu of the Local Methodist Primary School and Abdul Faikas of the Bagabaga Junior Secondary School received arrow wounds on their necks.

According to the medical officer of Tamale Regional Hospital, Mrs. Adu Adjei, others either received gunshot wounds or were hit by stones, or were trampled upon in the ensuing stampede. About half the number of those injured were treated and discharged while the more serious cases are to undergo surgery.

Narrating the incident, the regional secretary of the NDC, Alhaji B.A. Fuseini, said after a rally at the Police Park, they went on a victory march through the main streets of Tamale. He said while they were sending the NCP regional chairman, Alhaji Idrissu Kpadia home, they were attacked around the Abuabu Lorry Park by a

mob, some of whom were firing gunshots. Alhaji Fuseini said this enraged the supporters of the Progressive Alliance, so they quickly rallied others who were celebrating elsewhere to their rescue. There ensued a serious confrontation, making the supporters to retaliate by attacking the New Patriotic Party regional office at Abuabu, destroying everything in the office. However, the situation has been brought under control by the police, with support from the Army.

Meanwhile, at the rally the northern regional secretary, Lieutenant Colonel Abdulai Ibrahim, appealed to supporters of the Progressive Alliance to be tolerant in victory. He said the victory of the Alliance is for all Ghanaians, urging the supporters not to be complacent because there is another battle ahead.

Liberia

NPFL Leader Reportedly Flees to Burkina Faso

*AB1711094292 Monrovia Radio ELBC in English
0900 GMT 17 Nov 92*

[Text] Media reports reaching [us] from Man, Ivory Coast, say the leader of the NPFL [National Patriotic Front of Liberia], Charles Taylor, over the weekend fled Liberia and arrived in the Ivorian border town of Man en route to Burkina Faso. The reports from Man say the NPFL leader was seen with an entourage of relatives carrying seven suitcases loaded with personal effects. Sources from Man say Mr. Taylor arrived in Man from Liberia on a large Cessna plane which had reportedly taken off from somewhere in NPFL-occupied territory.

Meanwhile, reports from behind the lines say that lawlessness and chaos have become the order of the day in NPFL areas as its fighters go on the rampage against civilians.

ECOMOG Bombs Buchanan Port 16 Nov

*AB1611195892 London BBC World Service in English
1830 GMT 16 Nov 92*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Following their claim to have recaptured the Liberian rebel base at Caldwell from the NPFL [National Patriotic Front of Liberia], West African ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] forces appear to stepping up their efforts to cut off Charles Taylor's main supply routes. The NPFL controlled port of Buchanan suffered another bombing raid today. It was bombed on Saturday [14 November] night, but apparently there was not much damage. But today, it was a different story. On the line to Buchanan, Robin White asked Mr. Sayfrit, a British accountant with the mining company LIMCO [expansion unknown] what happened:

[Begin recording] [Sayfrit] At 2 o'clock this afternoon, there was a bombing raid [words indistinct] the Catholic

relief service warehouse near the Buchanan harbor. This went through the roofing and damaged the goods in the warehouse.

[White] Were any people hurt or killed?

[Sayfrit] Not to my knowledge.

[White] How many planes came over?

[Sayfrit] Two.

[White] Do you know what kind of planes they were?

[Sayfrit] No.

[White] This is the second time in just a couple of days, isn't it?

[Sayfrit] That is correct.

[White] What do you think the aim of these raids are?

[Sayfrit] I do not know. It is not really for me to say, but you must have to know from ECOMOG (?that aim).

[White] Do you presume that this is part of the blockade of Buchanan?

[Sayfrit] We must presume so.

[White] How frightened are people in Buchanan by these raids?

[Sayfrit] Well, many Liberians have gone home or have retreated into the bush.

[White] So, people have been fleeing Buchanan.

[Sayfrit] Some people have been fleeing, some (?are here.)

[White] What about yourself, are you frightened?

[Sayfrit] Well, it is not the best of situations to have planes [words indistinct] dropping bombs.

[White] The port of Buchanan, how operative it is at the moment?

[Sayfrit] It is not operative at the moment. It is open but there are no boats coming in.

[White] Why? Because the boats are frightened to come?

[Sayfrit] Presumably yes. [end recording]

Nigeria

President Says No 'Hidden' Transition Agenda

AB1711092292 Lagos Radio Nigeria Network
in English 0600 GMT 17 Nov 92

[Text] President Ibrahim Babangida says that his administration has no hidden agenda as far as the transition to civil rule is concerned. He made the assertion yesterday in Lagos at the annual conference of chiefs of Army Staff.

President Babangida explained that he was seeking the best option enumerated by the National Electoral Commission, NEC, and that this will be submitted to the Armed Forces Ruling Council today for final decision. The president expressed the hope that this will be the last time he will address such officers of the command as the commander in chief of the Armed Forces.

On ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group], General Babangida stressed that Nigeria had no expansionist territorial ambition. He explained that it was a collective decision by ECOWAS member states to bring about peace in Liberia.

Togo

Eyadema Addresses Marchers 14 Nov

AB1411222592 Lome Radio Lome in French 1900
GMT 14 Nov 92

[Excerpts] There was a march in support of President Gnassingbe Eyadema, head of state and commander in chief of the Armed Forces, in Lome this morning. On the initiative of the Rally of the Togolese People, thousands of citizens in Lome demonstrated their support for the head of state through a huge march that ended at the Presidency. [passage omitted]

It was a very cheerful atmosphere that reached its climax when the head of state appeared on the balcony of the palace. [passage omitted]

Addressing them, the president sincerely thanked them on behalf of his aides and himself for the long trip they made to the Presidency to reaffirm their support and solidarity for him. The head of state then briefed them on the political situation the country is facing, the urgent need to organize the elections before 31 December and the need for all Togolese to live in peace and security to build the nation in unity. On this last point and answering a question written on a placard: Whom Does The Strike Benefit? The president said that it benefits nobody, but rather helps destroy the country. Those calling for a strike are not genuine Togolese and they do not like their country. They have been assigned the mission to disorganize it.

Touching on the political situation in the country, the president stated that it is through dialogue and consultation that, at a negotiation table, we will find solutions to the difficulties lying on our democratic way. He stressed: The prime minister is my younger brother. He is entitled to make mistakes in discharging his extremely difficult mission of leading human beings. There are, no doubt, some problems, but with some goodwill we will succeed in finding solutions to the satisfaction of all, for the head of state stressed the more we drag our feet, the more our country will sink and become unrecognizable. Our economy will further deteriorate, socioeconomic

prospects will be blocked, and investors as well as financiers will drop us. With all this, it is the youth's future that will be jeopardized. It is therefore urgent to overcome this situation as soon as possible. The president stated that the political transition had lasted too long and that whatever may happen and whatever the circumstances, elections must be organized before 31 December.

Touching on security problems in the country, the president noted that the reintroduction of appropriate measures helped improve the situation significantly, which restored confidence in Togolese and foreign investors wishing to be established in our free trade zone. The president further spoke of the political parties's responsibilities and behaviors in the ongoing democratic process.

In conclusion, the president called on the Togolese for union, tolerance, mutual respect, and acceptance of others so that together—from the south to the north and from the east to the west—we can join our efforts to ensure the country's development.

'Protest March' Reported in Kpalime 15 Nov

AB1611152792 Lome Radio Lome in French 1230
GMT 15 Nov 92

[Excerpts] The people of Kpalime took to the streets this morning at the initiative of the Klouto district branch of the Union of Democratic Parties and Associations [UPAD]. Here is a report by Samtoui Komi Midakpe:

[Begin recording] It was a protest march that brought together several groups of workers, school children, artisans, traders, and farmers. Leading the demonstrators were the traditional leaders of the prefecture. The bands and placards carried by the marchers, who wore red headbands and who paraded throughout the streets of the town, spoke for themselves. The demonstrators also demanded the use of the single-ballot system during the elections and the reopening of the borders 24 hours a day. [passage omitted]

In a statement, the Klouto district UPAD spokesman, Koua Agbenu, denounced the assassinations, the 7 October shoot-out in Kpalime, various forms of attacks, plastic bomb attacks on people's homes, various instances of intimidation, the hostage taking of members of the High Council of the Republic [HCR], and the use of the unemployed to spread undemocratic ideas.

The demonstrators expressed support for the demands of the Coalition of Democratic Opposition-II [COD-II], notably the recomposition of the government, the creation of a special force to maintain peace, and the proclamation of the political neutrality of the Army. They expressed support for the steps taken by the prime minister's office, and encouraged the HCR in its difficult task to attain final victory—a victory which will not be won, as Togbui Kane said in his welcome address, like

small cakes, but at the price of hard work. We must therefore pray for the Almighty God to lead us safely home. Komi Afeli, the mayor of Kpalime, who received the demonstrators, told them to pray today, Sunday, for peace, security, and love for each other. [end recording]

Members of the High Council of the Coordination of Student Movements and Associations [HACAM] met at Tokoin Dumasese headquarters this morning. After examining the current burning problems of our country, they issued a statement condemning the general strike called by COD-II for 16 November. According to them, this strike dangerously compromises the future of the youth and, especially disturbs the reopening of the university which has hardly begun. The HACAM is of the opinion that today, no political party thinks about the problems of students but they rather think of personal interests which lead to the holding of untimely strikes.

Opposition's Strike Call Widely Followed

AB1611172292 London BBC World Service in English
1515 GMT 16 Nov 92

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Togolese opposition parties and trade unions have launched a strike today which threatens to prolong the crisis sparked off by army interference in the transition process. France and the United States have suspended military aid in protest to the attack by soldiers last month in which members of the transitional parliament were held hostage. And the organizers of this week's strike are threatening to turn their anger on President Eyadema and Prime Minister Koffigoh if they do not get satisfaction. On the line to Lome, Herba Saye asked Ebow Godwin if many workers will obey the strike call:

[Begin recording] [Godwin] Yes, there has been a massive response today to the strike action. Actually it is a strike action but it is meant also to initiate a kind of civil disobedience for President Eyadema. People have kept away from the streets, and from their work site and they are remaining at home and you can hardly find anybody on the streets. The shops have closed, the banks have closed, the market places are virtually closed, and government offices are also closed. In fact, there is no visible sign of any government employee turning up for work.

[Saye] What about essential services such as hospitals, for instance?

[Godwin] Because of the massive turnout, care has been taken to ensure that a skeleton staff mans essential services like the hospitals, electricity, water supply. As of talking to you now, in fact the minister for commerce and industries is appealing for, you know, essential staff to turn up for the maintenance of the supplies of petrol filling stations, the airport, and the Lome Autonomous Port. And they are also asking workers to turn up for the radio, television, [and] news agencies of Togo.

[Saye] Now, this strike is being called in order to get a pledge from the Armed Forces that they will not intervene in the transition to democracy. Are people confident that the strike will work or it is just a desperate measure, because they seem to be asking for a lot?

[Godwin] They are embarking on a seven days strike action. In fact, they call it resort to civil disobedience. If within seven days their demands are not met, they have warned that they will embark on indefinite strike action and then call for the resignation of President Eyadema

and Prime Minister Kokou Koffigoh and that they will not rest on their oars until these demands are met.

[Saye] Do you think these demands will be met?

[Godwin] Given the spirit of give and take and dialogue in Togo, which sometimes comes at the end of the day when you do not even expect any miracle, there might be some light at the end of the tunnel. But as at this moment, given the extreme position taken by both sides, it might be very difficult to predict that something positive will happen at this moment. [end recording]

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